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I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy is a very recent development in the evolution of civilization. Our
ancestors lived in small tribal groupings where, presumably, anything one did
or possessed was visible to the entire community. Residential privacy probably
became generally available only when humankind learned how to fashion and
heat individual dwellings. This connection between privacy and technology, in
fact, has persisted throughout most of our history. Enhancements of privacy
became possible only as technology permitted improvements in the quality of
life generally. The discovery and mastering of electricity, for example, permit-
ted the invention of the telephone, which enhanced dramatically people's abil-
ity to communicate privately. Only recently have we come to see technology as
a potential threat, as well as a boon, to privacy.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which guarantees "[tihe right
of the people to be secure, in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,"' established protection from un-
warranted governmental intrusion as a core American value. While the Fourth
Amendment has -been the subject of extensive litigation for the past century,
most of this litigation has focused on arrests and other physical seizures of
individuals or personal property, 2 and on the legal prerequisites for physical
entry into, and search of, private premises. 3 Comparatively few decisions have
focused on the implications of visual surveillance or upon surveillance technol-
ogy.4
I. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see infra text accompanying note 13 (providing full text of Fourth
Amendment).
2. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Amendment's protection of
persons). See generally 1-2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 3.1-3.7, 5.1-5.5 (2d ed. 1987)
(discussing probable cause and search and seizure of persons); 3 W. LAFAVE, supra, §§ 9.1-9.6
(discussing "lesser" searches).
3. See 1-2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, §§ 3.1-3.7, 4.1-4.13, 6.1-6.7 (discussing technological
encroachments on protected areas and interests); 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, §§ 7.1-7.5, 8.1-8.6,
10.1-10.5 (same).
4. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, §§ 2.2, 2.7 (discussing technologically-enhanced surveil-
lance of protected areas and interests). The Court has considered technology in a Fourth Amend-
ment context in approximately 34 cases since 1928. Of these, the vast majority dealt with
constitutional or statutory issues related to the interception of communications (wiretapping or
eavesdropping). See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238
(1979); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978);
United States v. New York Telephone, 434 U.S. 159 (1977); United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S.
413 (1977); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S.
505 (1974); United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974); Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41
(1972); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745 (1971); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S.
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Since 1983, however, seven Supreme Court decisions have focused at least in
part upon application of the Fourth Amendment to technological enhancement
of, or technological substitution for, visual surveillance: United States v.
Dunn5 and Texas v. Brown6 (artificial illumination); United States v. Knottse
and United States v. Karo (electronic tracking devices); California v. Ciraolo9
and Florida v. Riley'0 (aerial surveillance); and Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States" (image-magnifying aerial photography). Reaction to many of these de-
cisions has been highly critical.' 2
In six of the seven cases, investigators refrained from intruding physically
into a location protected by the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court held
in those cases that the surveillance was not a search. Only in Karo did investi-
gators effect a kind of physical intrusion, and in that case the Court con-
cluded that a search had occurred. This does not mean, however, that the
Court has equated physical intrusions and searches in a simplistic manner.
Particularly in those cases involving the use of sophisticated surveillance tech-
nology, the Court has proceeded cautiously, basing its decisions on narrow
factual grounds, rather than taking the opportunity to enunciate or develop
sweeping, general principles.
Still, certain patterns do emerge, or at least can be inferred, from this body
of case law. In deciding whether technologically enhanced visual surveillance is
a search, the Court, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly, has consid-
378 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967);
Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Benanti
v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942);
Nardone v. United States ("Nardone II"), 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S.
321 (1939); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928).
Two cases concern the use of field test kits to test for the presence of narcotics: United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1983), and Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). One decision ad-
dressed the question whether use of a trained narcotics detection dog is a search. United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
The only decision prior to 1983 that addressed visual surveillance technology is United States v.
Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927), which involved the use of a search light. See infra text accompanying
note 91-95 (discussing use of airplane in police search).
5. 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987).
6. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
7. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
8. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
9. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
10. 57 U.S.L.W. 4126 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1989) (No. 87-764) (plurality opinion). Riley was decided
by the Supreme Court as this Article went to press. See infra text accompanying notes 226-33
(discussing details of Riley decision).
11. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
12. For criticisms of Dow and Ciraolo, see Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy:" An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAD. L. REV. 1077 (1987); Comment, Dow
Chemical and Ciraolo: For Government Investigators the Sky's No Limit, 36 CATH. U.L. REV.
667 (1987). See also Fishmaan, Electronic Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment: Knotts,
Karo and the Questions Still Unanswered, 34 CATH. U.L. REv. 277 (1985) (analyzing Knotts and
Karo decisions in detail).
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ered three factors. Two relate directly to technology: the extent to which the
equipment enhanced the officers' natural senses, and the availability of such
equipment to the general public. The third factor that the Court has consid-
ered is the nature of the information sought or discovered by the surveillance.
This Article analyzes these seven decisions. Part II provides an overview of
basic Fourth Amendment principles. Part III reviews and critiques the Court's
treatment of technology, specifically artificial illumination, the use of elec-
tronic tracking devices, aerial surveillance and image-magnifying technology.
Part IV examines how the nature of the information sought and obtained by
the surveillance has influenced the decisions at which the Court arrived. Fi-
nally, the Article summarizes and evaluates this case law.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. The Exclusionary Rule
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure, in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' 3
Interpretation and application of the amendment can be broadly summarized
as follows. As a general rule, "searches and seizures" are lawful only if au-
thorized in advance by a judicially-issued warrant, based on facts that estab-
lish probable cause to believe that specific evidence of crime will be found in
"the place to be searched."' 4 If evidence is obtained in a manner that violates
-a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, the- prosecutor is not permitted to
use that evidence at trial to establish that defendant's guilt.'5 This principle,
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. "Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, though the Court has recognized a
few limited exceptions to this general rule." United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984). In
certain circumstances, however, searches and seizures are lawful even if no warrant has been ob-
tained, so long as probable cause existed at the time the search or seizure was conducted. Such is
the law governing searches of automobiles. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (scope
of search defined by places where there is probable cause to believe object may be found). Simi-
larly, police may lawfully search private premises without a warrant in exigent circumstances.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). In other circumstances, searches and seizures are lawful
even in the absence of probable cause, so long as a "reasonable suspicion" of wrongdoing existed
at the time. For example, police may temporarily stop and detain ("seize") an individual for
investigation without either a warrant or probable cause, so long as reasonable suspicion exists to
believe that the individual may be involved in criminal activity. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983). If the officer also has a reasonable suspicion that the person he seeks to stop and question
is armed, the officer may also conduct a superficial frisk ("search") of the individual. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
15. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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known as the "fourth amendment exclusionary rule," is intended to deter law
enforcement officials from conducting unlawful searches and seizures by de-
priving them of the incentive to do S0.16
B. The Definition of "Search"
Because the Fourth Amendment protects a person only against "unreasona-
ble searches and seizures," a defendant may attempt to challenge how the po-
lice or prosecution obtained evidence only if he can first show that the
authorities obtained that evidence by conducting either a "search" or a "sei-
zure. '1 7 The scope of the Fourth Amendment therefore depends upon the defi-
nitions given to the words, "search" and "seizure."'" The term "seizure" has
been the subject of extensive judicial analysis, but this body of case law has
little relevance to scientifically enhanced visual surveillance. 9
The term "search" has been the subject of even greater judicial scrutiny.
Until 1967, the Supreme Court had consistently held that investigative conduct
by police did not constitute a search unless that conduct physically invaded a
defendant's premises, property, or possessions. 0 Under this view, neither wire-
16. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-45 (1984); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268,
275-76 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
458 n.35 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at
657-68. In Mapp, the Court emphasized other purposes for the rule as well, including "the imper-
ative of judicial integrity," Id. at 659, but more recently the Court has stressed the deterrent
rationale as the primary justification for the rule.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984).
18. Analysis of the term "seizure" has focused primarily on what constitutes a seizure of a
person. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981) (detention of defendant while
police officers searched his premises constitutes a seizure within meaning of Fourth Amendment);
Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1980) (per curiam) (detention of defendant based solely on
fact that he fits "drug courier profile" constitutes unlawful seizure in violation of Fourth Amend-
ment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 & 19 n.16 (1968) (detention which restrains suspect's
freedom to walk away constitutes seizure within meaning of Fourth Amendment). Concerning the
seizure of an object, the Court in 1984 set forth the rule that "[a] 'seizure' of property occurs
when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that prop-
erty." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (footnote omitted).
19. Applying the Jacobsen definition of "seizure" in the context of electronic surveillance, the
Court has held that the installation of an electronic tracking device into or onto an item of per-
sonal property is "[alt most . . . a technical trespass on the space occupied by the" device, and is
therefore not a seizure of the property. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984). Beyond
this holding, the Court has not applied explicitly the term "seizure" to scientifically enhanced
visual surveillance.
20. For example, in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), the Court held that
the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to wiretapping unless government officials had physically
invaded the defendant's premises. In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942), the
Court applied the same rule to eavesdropping ("bugging"). In Goldman, federal agents overheard
conversations between defendants Goldman and Schulman by pressing a listening device against
the wall adjoining Schulman's office. Since there had been no physical trespass into Schulman's
premises, the Court reasoned that no search had occurred. In Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 509-12 (1961), on the other hand, the Court held that an illegal search had occurred
when police drove a microphone several inches into a party wall of the suspect's house. In Clin-
ton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (per curiam), the Court arrived at the same conclusion where
the microphone penetrated only thumbtack-deep.
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tapping nor bugging constituted a search, so long as investigators managed to
avoid such a physical invasion.
In Katz v. United States,2 however, the Supreme Court concluded that plac-
ing an electronic bug on the outside of a telephone booth to overhear Katz'
telephone conversation constituted a search even though there was no physical
penetration into the booth itself. 22 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court
emphasized that the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment were not
limited to those of property and freedom from physical trespass. Rather, the
Court emphasized that
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not plaices. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.2 3
Nevertheless as Justice Harlan stressed in his concurring opinion, "It]he
question, however, is what protection [the Fourth Amendment] affords to
those people." ' 24 Justice Harlan reasoned that Fourth Amendment protection
exists only if two conditions are present: "first that a person ha[s] exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "25
Justice Harlan's formula has become the basic definition of what the Fourth
Amendment protects.26 If a defendant seeks to suppress evidence or informa-
tion obtained by a law enforcement official, he must first establish that the
official engaged in conduct which intruded upon his " 'justifiable' . . . 'rea-
sonable' . . . or 'legitimate' expectation of privacy." If the defendant is una-
ble to establish that the investigators' conduct intruded upon his reasonable
expectation of privacy, then no "search" has occurred, no interest protected
by the Fourth Amendment was infringed upon, and the defendant is not enti-
tled to have the manner in which the evidence or information was obtained
measured against Fourth Amendment standards.
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. Id. at 350-51.
23. Id. at 352-53. Although the agents had probable cause to believe that Katz' conversations
would be incriminating and although they acted with restraint by listening only when Katz was in
the booth, the Court suppressed the agents' testimony as to what Katz said because the agents
had failed to obtain a warrant authorizing the use of the listening device. Id. at 356-57.
24. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
25. Id.
26. The Court has commented that "[cJonsistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held
that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protec-
tion can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been
invaded by government action." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 74041 (1979) (quoting Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 143 n.12 (1978) (discussing reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (same). See generally Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of
Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REv. 154 (1977) (reviewing Katz doctrine and analyzing possible mini-
mal thresholds for reasonable expectations of privacy).
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No definitive answer has yet emerged as to how to assess whether an expec-
tation of privacy is "legitimate," but the Court has observed that
it would, of course, be merely tautological to fall back on the no-
tion that those expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend
primarily on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases.
Legitimation of expectations of privacy must have a source outside
the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or
personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society.27
As this passage suggests, deciding whether privacy expectations are in fact le-
gitimated, either by "reference to concepts of . . property law or to under-
standings that are recognized and permitted by society," has on occasion been
a difficult and divisive process. Substantial controversy has focused on the
proper application of two concepts that limit the legitimacy of privacy expec-
tations, and thereby, the scope of the term "search" and the application of
the exclusionary rule.
1. Knowing Exposure
The Court in Katz observed that "what a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection. "28 If a person knowingly exposes something to the public,
the very fact of that exposure deprives him of any reasonable expectation of
privacy he may otherwise have had. Surveillance of that conduct or acquisition
of that information by the police is therefore not a Fourth Amendment
search. "The Fourth Amendment protection Of the home has never been ex-
tended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by
a home on public thoroughfares.' '29
Granted that "what a person knowingly exposes to the public" is not pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment, application of that principle can nonetheless
raise troubling questions. In particular, issues arise concerning the degree of
exposure, and the degree of knowledge of such exposure, that suffices to de-
prive behavior or conditions of their Fourth Amendment protection.3 0
2. Assumption of Risk
Even if a person exposes information or conduct to only a chosen few, he
has no Fourth Amendment complaint if one of his confidants is a police in-
27. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citation omitted).
29. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1984); see infra notes 91-125 and accompanying
text (discussing details of Ciraolo decision); see alsoMarshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315
(1978) ("What is observable by the public [may also be observed] without a warrant by [a) Gov-
ernment inspector as well").
30. See infra notes 102-03, 121-25 and accompanying text (discussing "knowing exposure" in
context of aerial surveillance).
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former or undercover agent who reports what he has seen and heard to the
authorities." "The risk of being ... betrayed by an informer or deceived as
to the identity of one with whom one deals is . . . the kind of risk we neces-
sarily assume whenever we speak." 32 As this is true in life generally, so too
with regard to the Fourth Amendment. The amendment provides no protection
to "a wrongdoer's mistaken belief that a person to whom he voluntarily con-
fides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.""
The "knowing exposure" and "assumption of risk" limitation on Fourth
Amendment protection could seriously undermine individual privacy if they are
applied in a "value-neutral" fashion. Justice Marshall has cautioned, for ex-
ample, that "whether privacy expectations are legitimate within the meaning of
Katz depend ... on the risks [an individual] should be forced to assume in a
free and open society .... [Cjourts must evaluate the 'intrinsic character' of
investigative practices with reference to the basic values underlying the Fourth
Amendment."13 4 A majority of the Court has conceded that, in some situa-
tions, "a normative inquiry" might sometimes be necessary.35
It should surprise no one that the Court has on several occasions divided
sharply when pondering such issues. The application of these questions to
technologically enhanced visual surveillance provides dramatic examples of such
disagreement.
II. TECHNOLOGY: SOPHISTICATION AND AvALABmrY
The Supreme Court has considered the Fourth Amendment implications of
scientifically enhanced visual surveillance in four contexts: artificial illumina-
tion; use of electronic tracking devices; aerial surveillance; and use of various
image magnifying devices (binoculars and sophisticated photography). In decid-
ing whether scientifically enhanced visual surveillance constitutes a search, 6 the
Court has applied the same test that it has applied in more traditional con-
texts. This test was originally coined by Justice Harlan in his Katz concur-
rence: the surveillance is a search for Fourth Amendment purposes only if it
intruded upon an expectation of privacy that society is willing to accept as
31. Hoffa.v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301-03 (1966); accord Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206, 210 (1966). Although Hoffa and Lewis were decided prior to Katz, the Fourth Amend-
ment principles enunciated in those decisions have been reiterated in numerous cases subsequent to
Katz. See, e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) (holding that surreptitious recording
of conversation by one party does not constitute search); White v. United States, 401 U.S. 745
(1971) (same).
32. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966) (citation omitted).
33. Id. at 302.
34. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750-51 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 740 n.5.
36. Only once has the Court considered whether an aspect of scientifically enhanced visual
surveillance should be classified as a seizure. See infra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), in which Court held installation of beeper did not
constitute a seizure). Judicial attention has therefore focused almost exclusively on application of
the term "search."
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"reasonable" or "legitimate. 3 7 The Court's decisions have focused, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, on two aspects of the technology: the extent to which the
equipment enhanced the officer's natural senses 8 and the availability of such
equipment to the general public.3 9 The more revealing and sense-enhancing that
the equipment is, the more likely a court will consider the use of such equip-
ment to be a search. On the other hand, the more widely available a particu-
lar item of surveillance equipment is, the less likely it is that its use will be
considered a search.
A. Artificial Illumination: The Brown and Dunn Decisions
The Court first considered the Fourth Amendment implications of enhanced
visual surveillance in the 1927 decision of United States v. Lee,1° and con-
cluded that it does not constitute a search for law enforcement officials on the
high seas to use a search light to enable them to see contraband on the deck
of a ship.4' Similarly in the 1983 decision of Texas v. Brown42 the Court con-
cluded that it does not constitute a search for an officer to shine his flashlight
to illuminate the interior of a lawfully stopped vehicle. 43 In explaining that
aspect of the Brown decision, the Court commented that "the use of artificial
means to illuminate a darkened area simply does not constitute a search, and
thus triggers no Fourth Amendment protection."'4
In each case, the officers were in a public place and the items under surveil-
lance were "knowingly exposed" to public view. In Lee, the ship was on the
high seas, and the items were plainly visible on the deck. In Brown, the auto-
mobile was on a public thoroughfare, and the balloon was in the passenger
compartment. The search light and flashlight used in these cases were imple-
ments that were technologically simple and widely available to the public. The
information sought was not particularly personal or private.
Although neither case presents analytical difficulties, Brown nevertheless
merits some attention. On its facts, the case merely holds that it does not
37. See supra text accompanying notes 21-27 (discussing Katz decision and subsequent cases).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 71-74, 150-59 (discussing use of beeper, photography,
and other surveillance and recording devices).
39. See infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text (discussing use of highly sophisticated sur-
veillance equipment not generally available to public).
40. 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
41. Id. at 563.
42. 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plurality opinion).
43. Id. at 740. The case involved the warrantless seizure from the motorist of an opaque party
balloon knotted a half-inch from its top, and a subsequent, warrantless field test of the powder
inside. The balloon was filled with heroin. Although all nine justices agreed that the officer had
acted lawfully, there was considerable disagreement as to why the warrantless field test did not
violate the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Justice Rehnquist wrote for a four-member
plurality; Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Blackmun joined; Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, filed their own concurrence. Although both
concurring opinions criticized various aspects of the plurality, neither objected to the plurality's
discussion of the officer's use of the flashlight that enabled him to see the balloon.
44. d.
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constitute a search for the police to use artificial means to illuminate a dark-
ened area that would be exposed to public view in daylight. However, the
Brown Court stated further that "the use of artificial means to illuminate a
darkened area simply does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth
Amendment protection.1 4 Such language sweeps much more broadly than the
facts in that case required. This language could, for example, give the police
the authority to shine a flashlight through the shuttered windows of a dark-
ened house to enable them to see inside-all without a warrant, without prob-
able cause, or without any legal justification whatsoever.
Was this "broader-than-necessary" language merely a slip of the pen, or
will the Brown rationale be applied in locations arguably much more private
than the passenger compartment of a car? In United States v. Dunn,4 a
seven-Justice majority, despite protestations to the contrary, appears to have
done precisely that. Law enforcement officers, investigating the suspected illicit
manufacture of drugs, 47 entered onto Dunn's ranch and crossed several wire
and wooden fences. 4' The officers then arrived at a clearing where Dunn's res-
idence, two barns and other outbuildings were located. At the gateway of the
larger barn, the officers observed that the front of the barn was enclosed by a
wooden fence and had an open overhang. 49 Entrance to the barn itself was
blocked by locked, waist-high gates. Netting material was stretched from the
ceiling of the barn to the top of the wooden gates. The netting was suffi-
ciently opaque to prevent someone from seeing inside unless the observer
stood immediately next to the netting.50 Shining a flashlight through the net-
ting,, the officers peered into the barn and saw what they believed was an
illicit drug laboratory. Their observations became the basis for a search war-
rant, pursuant to which they seized illicit drugs and related paraphernalia. 5
45. Id.
46. 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987).
47. In September of 1980, agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") learned that a man named Carpenter had ordered substantial quantities of chemicals
and equipment used in the manufacture of methamphetamine and phenylacetone. The agents ob-
tained a court order authorizing the placement of electronic tracking devices in some of the equip-
ment and chemical containers before Carpenter took possession. By lawfully monitoring one of
the "beepers" and conducting aerial surveillance, the agents eventually traced the chemicals,
equipment, and Carpenter's pickup truck, which had transported some of these items, to a barn
behind the ranch house of defendant Dunn's 198-acre ranch. Id. at 1137.
48. Dunn's ranch was completely surrounded by a perimeter fence. The property also con-
tained several interior fences, constructed mainly of posts and multiple strands of barbed wire.
The officers did not have a warrant authorizing them to trespass on Dunn's property. Id.
49. The barn, together with the residence and other outbuildings, were "located in a clearing
surrounded by woods, one-half mile from a road, down a chained, locked driveway. Neither the
farmhouse nor its outbuildings [were) visible from the public road or from the fence that encircles
the entire property." Although the officers were unable to see through its solidly built back and
sides, id. at 1142 (Brennan, J., dissenting), they detected the aroma of phenylacetic acid, a neces-
sary ingredient in the manufacture of methamphetamine, coming from the barn. Id. at 1137-38.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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The Supreme Court held that Dunn's Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated. The main issue in the case was whether the clearing, and in particu-
lar the barn, was part of the "curtilage" of Dunn's home, and therefore pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches; or whether
these areas were the constitutional equivalent of "open fields," which enjoy
no Fourth Amendment protection.12 Dividing seven to two, the Court con-
cluded these areas were open fields that incurred no constitutional protec-
tions.53 Moreover, the majority held that it did not constitute a search for the
officers to look inside the barn even assuming the barn itself was a business
premises protected by the Fourth Amendment: "The Fourth Amendment has
never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes
when passing by a home on public thoroughfares." 5.
52. In Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), Justice Holmes wrote the opinion for the
Court holding that "the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in
their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction
between the latter and the .house is as old as the common law." Id. at 59. Sixty years later in
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), Justice Powell's opinion for the Court reaffirmed
the open fields doctrine. Thus, police officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they
trespass onto fenced, posted private land to look for incriminating evidence.
As in Hester, the Oliver Court stressed that unlike open fields, the "curtilage" of a house is
protected by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable governmental intrusion. The Oliver
Court observed:
mhe curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the
"sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life," and therefore has been consid-
ered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Thus, courts have
extended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the
curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the factors that determine whether
an individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home
will remain private.
Id. at 180 (citation omitted).
53. The Court enunciated a four-part test to determine whether an area is curtilage or open
field, including consideration of
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is
included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which
the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observa-
tion by people passing by.
United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1139-40. Applying these factors, the Court concluded that
all four argued against including the barn within the curtilage of Dunn's ranch house. Perhaps
most surprising was the Court's conclusion that "[respondent did little to protect the barn area
from observation by those standing in the open fields" because the various fences on Dunn's
property were "typical ranch . . . fences, . . . designed and constructed to corral livestock, not to
prevent persons from observing what lay inside the enclosed area." Id. at 1140.
54. Id. at 1141 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1985)). In Ciraolo, the
Court held that even though a fenced-in back yard was within the curtilage of a house, it did not
constitute a search for police to conduct naked-eye aerial surveillance of the yard. See infra notes
91-136 (discussing Ciraolo decision in detail).
In Dunn, the Court, after quoting Ciraolo, commented: "[i]mportantly, we deemed it irrelevant
[in Ciraolo] that the police observation at issue was directed specifically at the identification of
marijuana plants growing on an area protected by the Fourth Amendment." United States v.
Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1141.
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The Court further held that the use of the flashlight did not constitute a
search:
[T]he plurality opinion in Texas v. Brown notes that it is "beyond
dispute" that the action of a police officer in shining his flashlight
to illuminate the interior of a car, without probable cause to search
the car, "trenched upon no right secured . . . by the Fourth
Amendment." The holding in United States v. Lee is of similar im-
port. Here, the officers' use of the beam of a flashlight, directed
through the essentially open front of respondent's barn, did not
transform their observations into an unreasonable search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
This passage is noteworthy for its brevity, its conclusory nature, and the lack
of any acknowledgement that the interior of a Fourth Amendment-protected
structure might merit different treatment, or at least raise different issues, than
the interior of a car or the deck of a ship at sea, locations which are "know-
ingly exposed" to public view.56 The paragraph as a whole implies strongly
that whenever the officer need not "shield his eyes when passing by a home
on public thoroughfares," he need not shield his flashlight either. The use of
a flashlight, in other words, may be constitutionally indistinguishable from na-
ked-eye surveillance.
Interestingly enough, the Dunn majority did not quote the passage from
Brown that can be read to hold that use of a flashlight is never a search."
Rather, the Dunn Court commented pointedly that the officers shone their
flashlight "through the essentially open front of respondent's barn." If the
front of the barn was "essentially open" (a remarkable description given the
barricades surrounding it),58 perhaps Dunn can be said to have "knowingly
exposed" its interior to any police officer who happened to be trespassing ille-
gally at its doorway. Thus, Dunn can be seen as factually quite similar to Lee
and Brown. All three cases can be read as stating simply the obvious: it is not
a search for police officers, positioned in a constitutionally unprotected loca-
tion, to use a widely available, "low-technology" device like a flashlight to
illuminate a location that is "knowingly exposed" to their scrutiny.
On the other hand, Dunn leaves uncertainty as to whether there is ever any
constitutional protection against surveillance with a flashlight to protect a pri-
vate location that is not knowingly exposed. 9
55. United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1141.
56. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). See supra notes 28-30 and
accompanying text (discussing exposure standard set forth in Katz).
57. See supra text accompanying note 45 (quoting broad language used in Brown).
58. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (discussing number of fences and other barri-
cades surrounding barn).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 211-17 (discussing electronic surveillance used in homes
and apartments).
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B. Electronic Tracking Devicesw°
In the 1983 decision of United States v. Knotts,61 and again in the 1984
decision of United States v. Karo,6 the Supreme Court considered the Fourth
Amendment implications of electronic devices that enable investigators to mon-
itor the location of the device and the object to which it has been attached. 63
Each case began, as do most such "beeper" cases, when law enforcement
officials learned that certain individuals had ordered large quantities of a
chemical that, in addition to many lawful uses, is also useful in the prepara-
tion of illicit drugs.64 With the seller's consent prior to the sale, the agents
installed an electronic beeper in one of the containers, and then sold it to the
suspects. In Knotts, the police then used the beeper to monitor the movement
of the container from the place of purchase to the general vicinity of a cabin
in a rural part of Wisconsin later the same day. In Karo, from time to time
over a five month period, the agents used a variety of surveillance techniques,
including the beeper, to track the container to three private houses, two stor-
age lockers rented at separate storage facilities, the driveway of a fourth
home, and, ultimately, a fifth house. In both Knotts and Karo, visual surveil-
lance thereafter established probable cause to believe that the chemicals were
indeed being used to prepare illicit drugs. In each case, the agents subse-
quently obtained a search warrant and seized incriminating evidence.
The Knotts and Karo decisions resolved many, but not all, of the issues that
have arisen with regard to such devices. 65 Of particular relevance here, the
60. For an exhaustive discussion of these issues, see Fishman, supra note 12, at 277-395. The
following discussion of tracking devices, infra text accompanying notes 62-91, is adopted from
that earlier article.
61. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
62. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
63. Such an electronic tracking device is often
called a "beeper," "beacon," or "transponder" [and consists of] a miniature, bat-
tery-powered radio transmitter that emits a recurrent signal at a set frequency. When
monitored by directional finders, the beeper provides information as to the location
and movement of the object to which it is attached. A beeper is incapable of trans-
mitting conversation or recording sounds. For this reason, beepers do not fall within
the definition of wiretapping devices.
United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139, 1142-43 (5th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted), rev'd and re-
manded, 729 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984).
64. In Knotts, Minnesota police were notified by a chemical company that an individual had
ordered chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine, including chloroform. In Karo, an
individual notified Drug Enforcement Administration agents that Karo and others had ordered
fifty gallons of ether from him, and that they would use the chemical in the preparation of co-
caine (the cocaine had been dissolved into a liquid solution and absorbed into clothing, which had
then been imported into the United States; the conspirators planned to use the ether to extract the
cocaine from the clothing). Brief for the United States at 3-4, United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705 (1984) (No. 83-850); Brief for Respondents Harley and Horton at 3, id.
65. The Court held that it constitutes neither a search nor a seizure to install a beeper into a
container of non-contraband chemicals with the consent of the current owner, and then sell the
container to the target of the investigation, whom the authorities suspect will use the chemicals to
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Knotts and Karo opinions implicitly divide the use of beepers to track or lo-
cate the container into three categories, which may be labelled "in-transit
monitoring," "general vicinity monitoring" and "private location monitoring."
In Knotts, the Court held that monitoring a "beepered" object while it is
"in transit" along public roads does. not constitute a search.6 Knotts and
Karo both hold that no search occurs if, having lost the beepered object, the
agents then monitor the beeper to determine the "general vicinity" (but not
the specific private location, if any) to which it has been taken.6 7 Karo holds
that it is a search subject to Fourth Amendment standards, including the war-
rant requirement, when agents monitor the beeper to determine if the host
object is inside a particular private location, such as a residence or rented
storage locker.6 1
Thus, whether monitoring is a search depends upon the nature of the infor-
mation the beeper reveals. Monitoring that discloses only the movement of the
beepered object in public, or only the general vicinity to which it has been
taken, is not a search. Monitoring that discloses the object's presence in (or
absence from) a particular private location is a search.
1. In-transit Monitoring: The Knotts Decision
Minnesota police discovered that Tristan Armstrong periodically purchased
from a chemical company chemicals that could be used to manufacture illicit
drugs. The officers further discovered that after Armstrong purchased these
chemicals, he would deliver them to an accomplice, Darryl Petschen. With the
consent of the seller company, the officers installed a beeper in a five-gallon
manufacture illicit drugs. This is not a seizure, the Court held, because it was "at most a techni-
cal trespass on the space occupied by the beeper," which did not involve any "meaningful inter-
ference with [respondent's] possessory interests in" the container. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
at 712.
As to whether installation and subsequent transfer was a search, the Court observed that while
the transfer of the container to the suspect "created a polential for an invasion of privacy, we
have never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. ... It is the exploitation of technological advances that im-
plicates the Fourth Amendment, not their mere existence." Id. (emphasis in original). The Court
likened the transfer of an unmonitored beeper to a police officer carrying a parabolic microphone
capable of picking up conversations in nearby homes. Possession of the microphone does not
constitute a search; the search occurs only when the microphone is in fact turned on and used to
overhear private conversations. Id.
66. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280-82.
67. Id. at 285; United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-14.
68. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-15. Although the Ka7ro decision resolved several
important issues, it left other questions unanswered. In particular, the Court in Karo explicitly
declined to discuss whether such a warrant would have to be supported by probable cause, the
traditional factual showing required for a search warrant, or whether, because beeper surveillance
is so much less intrusive than other searches, the lesser standard of "reasonable suspicion" would
suffice. Id. at 718 n.5. Moreover, there are no clear guidelines indicating where the line is to be
drawn, between the in-transit and general location monitoring that Knotts holds are not a search,
and private location monitoring, which Karo holds is a search.
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container of chloroform, one of the chemicals necessary to manufacture am-
phetamines. The next time Armstrong purchased chemicals, he was given the
container in which the beeper had been installed.
Using both visual surveillance and the beeper, the officers followed Arms-
trong to Petschen's home, where the container was transferred to Petschen's
automobile. The officers then followed the vehicle into Wisconsin. During the
latter part of his journey, Petschen began driving evasively, and the agents
lost both visual and beeper contact with his vehicle. Approximately one hour
later, a helicopter equipped with a monitor detected the beeper signal, now
stationary, in the vicinity of a cabin occupied by Knotts in a rural part of
Wisconsin.
After three days of intermittent visual surveillance of the cabin, police offi-
cers obtained a search warrant. Searching the cabin, they found a fully opera-
ble, clandestine laboratory for drug production with equipment valued at more
than $10,000, formulas for amphetamine and methamphetamine, and chemicals
in sufficient quantity to produce fourteen pounds of pure amphetamine. Under
a barrel outside the cabin, they also found the five-gallon container with the
beeper. The only question before the Court in Knotts was whether it consti-
tuted a "search" for the police to use the beeper to follow Petschen and,
after having lost their quarry, to determine that the beepered container of
chloroform had come to rest in the vicinity of Knotts' cabin. The Court held
that it did not.
The Court emphasized that " 'the application of the Fourth Amendment
depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a "justifia-
ble," a "reasonable," or a "legitimate expectation of privacy" that has been
invaded by government action.' ",69 A unanimous Court concluded that
Petschen failed to demonstrate such an invasion:
A person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
place to another. When Petschen travelled over the public streets he
voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he
was travelling over particular roads in a particular direction, the
fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destina-
tion when he exited from public roads onto private property. 7°
The Court emphasized that "[v]isual surveillance from public places . .. ad-
joining Knotts' premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the
police." 7 ' The fact that the police relied on the beeper in addition to visual
surveillance to acquire this information "does not alter the situation," 72 the
Court concluded, adding that "[nlothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited
69. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 US. 735, 740
(1979)).
70. Id. at 281-82.
71. Id. at 282.
72. Id.
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the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this
case." 73 The mere fact that "scientific devices such as the beeper enabled the
police to be more effective in detecting crime," the Court stated, did not give
rise to a constitutional violation. The Court concluded: "We have never
equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so
now. " 
74
2. Private Location Monitoring: The Karo Decision
Karo holds that private location monitoring of a beeper constitutes a search
subject to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Karo also reaffirmed
and broadened the Knotts holding that general vicinity monitoring is not a
search, but did not draw a clear line between it and private location monitor-
ing (the latter of which is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement).7 5
The Karo case began when an individual informed DEA agents that a group
of cocaine traffickers asked him to supply them with several drums of ether.
The traffickers needed the ether because they had arranged to have cocaine
dissolved into clothing that was then imported into the United States; the
ether would be used to precipitate the cocaine back out again. With this indi-
vidual's permission, the agents hid a beeper in one of the drums. After the
purchasers took possession, the agents used the beeper to track the drum to
three private residences, then to two storage facilities. Significantly, they
learned which locker the drums were stored in, not from the beeper, but by
asking the facility manager. Finally, five months after the sale of the ether,
the agents tracked the drums to the driveway of a fourth home and, ulti-
mately, a fifth house, where incriminating evidence was finally seized.
The Court began its analysis by restating fundamental Fourth Amendment
principles. First, "private residences are places in which the individual nor-
mally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a war-
rant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize
as justifiable."176 Second, "[slearches and seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances. ' 77
These principles, the Court held, compelled the conclusion that private loca-
tion monitoring constituted a sufficient intrusion into the residence to be con-
sidered a search. This would be the case, the Court emphasized, even if the
agents had first tracked the beepered article to the residence by visual surveil-
lance, for "the later monitoring not only verifies the officers' observations but
73. Id. at 282-83.
74. Id. at 284.
75. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing Knots and Karo decisions and
their relation to electronic monitoring issues).
76. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
77. Id. at 714-15.
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also establishes that the article remains on the premises." ' The Court stated
that such monitoring is
less intrusive than a full-scale search, but it does reveal a critical
fact about the interior of the premises that the Government is ex-
tremely interested in knowing and that it could not have otherwise
obtained without a warrant. The case is thus not like Knotts, for
there the beeper told the authorities nothing about the interior of
Knotts' cabin. The information obtained in Knotts was "voluntarily
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look." . . . [H]ere, as we have
said, the monitoring indicated that the beeper was inside the house,
a fact that could not have been visually verified. . . . Indiscriminate
monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view
would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the
home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment over-
sight .79
Although the specific factual context under discussion in Karo was a private
residence, the Court stated explicitly that this holding applies as well to other
locations in which privacy expectations are recognized as reasonable."0 The
Court drew a careful distinction, however, between monitoring that reveals an
object's presence inside such a location and therefore constitutes a search, and
monitoring that only reveals that the object is in the general vicinity of such a
location. Such monitoring, the Court made clear, is not a search. 8'
3. General Vicinity Monitoring: Knotts and Karo
In Knotts, the Court held that the placing of a radio transmitter by the
police inside a chloroform container in order to facilitate the surveillance of
the container from its place of purchase to its final destination, in this case a
cabin in rural Wisconsin, was not a search. The Court reasoned that a search
had not occurred because the radio transmitter did not indicate whether the
container was actually inside the cabin, and thus did not reveal information
on the contents of the cabin. 2 The Court used similar logic in Karo, when it
78. Id. at 715.
79. Id. at 715-16.
80. Id. at 720 n.6. The Court further held that, as a rule, private location monitoring of a
beeper inside a private residence is lawful only if authorized by a warrant. Id. at 714-18. The
Court noted but did not address whether a showing of reasonable suspicion rather than probable
cause would suffice for the issuance of such a warrant. Id. at 718 n.5; see Fishman, supra note
12, at 372-90 (discussing problems and issues that arise in applying warrant requirement to beeper
surveillance). The Court added that "if truly exigent circumstances exist no warrant is required
under general Fourth Amendment principles." United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. at 718.
81. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing Knotts and Karo decisions and
their relation to electronic monitoring issues).
82. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-83 (holding that monitoring of "beeper signals"
of radio transmitter did not invade any reasonable expectation of privacy since beeper surveillance
merely facilitated following of automobile on public streets and highways).
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upheld the lawfulness of the police's electronic monitoring of the movement of
a can of ether. In Karo, the police were able to determine that a can of ether
had been taken into a commercial storage facility, but were unable to identify
the specific locker which contained the can. 3 The Court stated that this moni-
toring of the beeper signal "revealed nothing about the contents of the
locker" that the suspects had rented, and therefore "was not a search of that
locker."8 a4 The Court noted that "[hiad the monitoring disclosed the presence
of the container within a particular locker the result would be otherwise, for
surely [the suspects] had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own stor-
age locker. '"8"
The principle that emerges from these decisions is that monitoring that re-
veals the precise private location to which the beeper has been taken is a
search; monitoring that reveals only the general vicinity of the beeper is not.
The difficulty lies in drawing the line between the two. For example, had the
agents in Karo been able to determine on which floor of the storage facility
the ether can was located would the Court have found that a search had oc-
curred? If not, what if the police had determined in which row of lockers on
that floor the ether had been stored-would the Court then have found that a
search had occurred?
Until the law is clarified, investigators may be forced to play a form of
"Fourth Amendment roulette." Each additional piece of information the po-
lice can derive from electronic devices-each narrowing of the investigative fo-
cus-puts them a step closer to what is factually required for a court order to
permit private location monitoring. Yet, the agents will have no sure way of
knowing at what point the use of the beeper crosses the line that separates
non-search from search-a crossing that could prove fatal to the investigation.
This state of affairs is unsettling in that it promotes neither police efficiency
nor individual privacy.
C. Tracking Devices and Artificial Illumination: A Comparison
The Court held in United States v. Dunn that it is not a search for a police
officer to use artificial illumination to see inside a location not within the cur-
tilage of a house, so long as the officer does not physically intrude into an
area protected by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches . 6
Karo held that it is a search to use a beeper and monitor to determine
whether a specific object is inside a private location, even if the officer does
not physically intrude into a location protected by the Fourth Amendment. 7
These results are not difficult to reconcile.
83. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. at 720 (holding that mere installation of electronic beeper
into can to aid police's monitoring of can's movement did not violate Fourth Amendment).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 720 n.6.
86. 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139-41 (1987); see supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text (discussing
details of Dunn and related cases).
87. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-16 (1984); see supra notes 75-81 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Karo and private location monitoring).
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The divergent results in Karo and Dunn cannot be attributed to the loca-
tion. With regard to the officers' observation point, in Karo the police officers
were not even on the suspect's property when they utilized their equipment."8
In this respect, the agents' conduct in Karo was less physically intrusive than
that of the officers' in Dunn. Regarding the location under surveillance, al-
though the differences between the barn in Dunn and the cabin in Karo are
self-evident, the Court in Dunn proceeded on the assumption that the barn
was a business location protected by the Fourth Amendment. 9 Thus, the loca-
tion under surveillance is probably not the factor that distinguishes the two
cases. Nor can the explanation be the nature of the information sought and
obtained. In Karo, the agents confirmed that a chemical container was in a
cabin, while in Dunn, the agents saw chemicals and lab equipment in a barn.
Logically, therefore, it must be the remaining factor that explains these dif-
fering results: the nature and quality of the surveillance equipment the officers
used. Dunn involves the least sophisticated and most available of all surveil-
lance devices, the flashlight, which simply allows an officer to see that which
(but for the darkness) would be visible to the naked eye. The investigators in
Karo, in contrast, were using equipment not available to the public at large.
Their specialized equipment enabled the agents, in a sense, to "see through
walls" into the privacy of a home to determine the presence or absence of a
specific physical object. The Court quite understandably concluded that this
enhancement was enough to constitute a search subject to the warrant require-
ment.90
D. Aerial Surveillance: California v. Ciraolo and Florida v. Riley
Although the surveillance in California v. Ciraolo9l was conducted with the
unaided naked eye, Ciraolo nevertheless merits discussion as an "enhanced vi-
sual surveillance" case because the officers obtained their vantage point in a
scientifically enhanced manner-from an airplane.
Police officers received an anonymous telephone tip that marijuana was
growing in respondent's back yard. Surveillance from ground level was impos-
sible, because the yard was surrounded by a six-foot outer fence and a ten-
foot inner fence. Two officers trained in marijuana identification therefore se-
cured a private plane and flew within navigable airspace over respondent's
house at an altitude of 1,000 feet. From this vantage point the officers identi-
fied marijuana plants, eight to ten feet i. height, growing in a plot in respon-
88. The mere presence of the container inside the cabin does not, by itself, constitute a search.
An unmonitored beeper creates only a potential, not an actual, invasion of privacy. United States
v. Karo, 468 U.S. at 712. The search occurs only when the agents monitor the beeper to deter-
mine whether the object is inside. See supra note 65 (discussing use of radio transmitters for
surveillance).
89. United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1141.
90. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing surveillance unaided by technology).
91. 476 U.S. 207 (1985), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1014 (1986).
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dent's yard. They included this information in an affidavit, obtained a search
warrant, and seized seventy-three marijuana plants. 92
Arrested and charged with cultivation of marijuana, Ciraolo pleaded guilty
and then appealed. He complained that the aerial surveillance was an unlawful
search, which had tainted the search warrant (probable cause for which was
based primarily on the information derived from the surveillance) and the evi-
dence seized pursuant to the warrant. 93 Contending that he had done all that
could reasonably be expected to demonstrate his expectation of privacy in his
yard, Ciraolo argued that he had not "knowingly" exposed himself to surveil-
lance from above. 94
The California Court of Appeal agreed, and suppressed the evidence. That
state court reasoned that because the fly-over was for the specific purpose of
observing the enclosed portion of Ciraolo's yard, rather than a "routine patrol
conducted for any other legitimate law enforcement or public safety objec-
tive," the flight constituted a search that, in the absence of a warrant, vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment. 9
1. The Ciraolo Majority
The United States Supreme Court reversed the California court's decision.
In an opinion joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor,
Chief Justice Burger concluded that the aerial observation flight did not con-
stitute a "search.'"'9 The Court reached this result by what it insisted was a
straightforward application of the Katz two-prong test: "first, has the individ-
ual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the chal-
lenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable? '97
With regard to the first prong of Katz, the Court acknowledged that the
ten-foot fence clearly manifested Ciraolo's subjective intent "to conceal the
marijuana crop from at least street level views." 98 The Court then turned to
92. Id. at 209.
93. Id. If a search warrant is issued on an investigator's affidavit that includes information
that is "tainted," in that it was obtained in a way that violated the search-target's constitutional
rights, a reviewing court in a subsequent challenge to the validity of the warrant should excise
retroactively the tainted information. If what is left fails to establish probable cause, the warrant
is considered invalid and evidence seized pursuant to the search must be suppressed. If probable
cause still exists after the tainted information is eliminated, the warrant is considered valid and
the evidence is admissible. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. at 719-21.
94. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 210.
95. 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 97 (1984).
96. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211.
97. Id.
98. Id. The Court noted California's concession that Ciraolo had such a subjective expectation,
and stated, "we need not address that issue." Id. Nevertheless, the Court commented:
Yet a 10-foot fence might not shield these plants from the eyes of a citizen or a
policeman perched on the top of a truck or a 2-level bus. Whether respondent there-
fore manifested a subjective expectation of privacy from all observations of his back-
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the second inquiry under Katz of whether that expectation is reasonable. "In
pursuing this inquiry," the majority opinion admonished, "we must keep in
mind that '[tihe test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to
conceal allegedly "private" activity,' but instead 'whether the government's in-
trusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth
Amendment.' ""
The Court acknowledged that Ciraolo's back yard was within the curtilage
of his home.10° The Fourth Amendment therefore protected Ciraolo's right to
privacy against any police search of his yard.10 "[Tihe question remains," the
Court continued, "whether naked-eye observation of the curtilage by police
from an aircraft lawfully operating at an altitude of 1,000 feet violates an
expectation of privacy that is reasonable.' '0 2 The Court concluded that the
flight did not violate such an expectation because Ciraolo had no such expec-
tation in the first place:
The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been ex-
tended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when
passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact
that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his
activities preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage
point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities
clearly visible. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection." 101
The Court stressed that the flight stayed within publicly navigable air-
space,1' the surveillance was conducted in a "physically nonintrusive manner,"
and that from an altitude of 1,000 feet the officers were able to detect the
yard, or whether instead he manifested merely a hope that no one would observe his
unlawful gardening pursuits, is not entirely clear in these circumstances.
Id. at 211-12 (emphasis in original).
99. Id. at 212 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-83 (1984)).
100. Id. The Court commented that
[t]he protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and per-
sonal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psycho-
logically, where privacy expectations are most heightened. [Ciraolo's yard] was
immediately adjacent to a suburban home, surrounded by high double fences. This
close nexus to the home would appear to encompass this small area within the curti-
lage.
Id. at 212-13. It is uncertain whether a typical back yard that is not surrounded by high double
fences would qualify as curtilage. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing concept
of curtilage).
101. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
104. Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982) that directs that citizens of United States have public
right of "freedom of transit through the navigable airspace of the United States").
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marijuana with the naked eye, unaided by any technological enhancement 05
"Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down," the
Court emphasized, "could have seen everything that the officers observed."'' 0
In deciding whether the aerial surveillance constituted a search, it was "ir-
relevant" that the sole purpose of the flight was to enable officers trained to
recognize marijuana to view Ciraolo's back yard."°" There is no constitutional
difference, the Court asserted, between "ground-level" police surveillance on a
particular place, and "aerial" police surveillance on that same location.1'8 In-
sisting that the case was one of "simple visual observations from a public
place,"' ' 9 and that the police overflight was no different for constitutional
purposes than "a power company repair mechanic on a pole overlooking the
yard," 0 the Court concluded that "respondent's expectation that his garden
was protected from such observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation
that society is prepared to honor.""'
Surveillance involving a use of technology that " 'discloses to the senses
those intimate associations, objects or activities otherwise imperceptible to po-
lice or fellow citizens' " might constitute a search, the Court noted. 1 '2 How-
105. Id. The Court noted that although the officers photographed Ciraolo's house and yard,
neither the respondent nor the state raised any distinct issue as to the photograph. Moreover, the
photograph played no real role in the investigation. Indeed, one of the officers testified that the
marijuana plants were not readily discernable in the photograph. Hence, the photograph did not
present any issues in Ciraolo. Id. at 212 n.l. In the companion case of Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), however, aerial photography was at the very center of the
Fourth Amendment issues. See infra notes 194-210 and accompanying text (discussing expectations
of privacy).
106. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
107. Id. at 213.
108. Id. at 214 n.2. Indeed, the Court praised the officers for their ingenuity, stating that
"[siuch observation is precisely what a judicial officer needs to provide a basis for a warrant."
Id. at 214. The Court therefore rejected explicitly the California Court of Appeal's attempt to
distinguish between a "routine patrol flight," which would not constitute a search of Ciraolo's
yard, and the actual flight, which "focused" on his property: "[W]e find difficulty understanding
exactly how respondent's expectations of privacy from aerial observation might differ when two
airplanes pass overhead at identical altitudes, simply for different purposes." Id. at 214 n.2.
109. Id. at 214.
110. Id. There is in fact a substantial constitutional difference. The police officer is a state
agent, the legality of whose conduct is therefore measured against Fourth Amendment standards.
The power company mechanic (assuming the company is privately owned) is not a state agent. No
Fourth Amendment basis exists, therefore, to suppress evidence based on his or her observations,
even if they violated the homeowner's constitutional rights. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465 (1921) (holding constitutional government's use of incriminating evidence turned over to gov-
ernment by private parties who procured the evidence through wrongful search without participa-
tion or knowledge of government).
Earlier in the opinion, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, had commented that Cira-
olo's ten-foot fence "might not shield [the marijuana plants] from the eyes of a citizen or a
policeman perched on the top of a truck or a 2-level bus." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at
211.
111. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214.
112. Id. at 215 n.3 (citation omitted). The Court further noted that in Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), decided the same day, it held that "the use of an aerial
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ever, the Court insisted that no such use of technology had occurred: "The
Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police travelling in the public
airways [at 1,000 feet] to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible
to the naked eye." '" 3
2. The Ciraolo Dissent
The dissent, written by Justice Powell and joined by Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall and Stevens, made three basic points. First, given the yard's proximity to
the house, the domestic activities for which the yard was sometimes used and
the efforts to shield the yard from the view of passers-by, Ciraolo's back yard
was part of the residential curtilage." 4 Thus, Justice Powell wrote, this case
involves "surveillance of a home,""' 5 the "place in which a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy virtually always will be legitimate" and therefore protected by
the Fourth Amendment. 1 6
Second, the police used "an airplane-a product of modern technology-to
intrude visually into respondent's yard."' 17 By ignoring the significance of this
fact, Justice Powell wrote, the majority "departs significantly from the stan-
dard developed in Katz for deciding when a Fourth Amendment violation has
occurred.""' 8 That the officer's flight was in "publicly navigable airspace" and
did not physically intrude into Ciraolo's curtilage is "constitutionally irrele-
vant," Powell argued. "Reliance on the manner of surveillance is directly con-
trary to the standard of Katz, which identifies a constitutionally protected
privacy right by focusing on the interests of the individual and of a free soci-
mapping camera to photograph an industrial manufacturing complex from navigable airspace simi-
larly does not require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
at 215 n.3; see infra notes 139-210 and accompanying text (discussing Dow and Ciraolo decisions
and their implications regarding determination of legitimate expectations of privacy).
113. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
114. Id. at 220-21 (Powell, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 220 (Powell, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (citations omitted).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 216 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell described the Court's post-Katz decisions
as repeated refusals "to freeze ' "into constitutional law those enforcement practices that existed
at the time of the Fourth Amendment's passage." ' Rather, we have construed the Amendment
' "in light of contemporary norms and conditions," ' in order to prevent 'any stealthy encroach-
ments' on our citizens' right to be free of arbitrary official intrusion." Id. at 217-18 (citations
omitted). Justice Powell sought in this passage to demonstrate how firmly these principles are
established by quoting liberally from prior opinions. The quoted portions beginning "into consti-
tutional law . . ." and "in light of ... " first appeared in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
591 n.33 (1980), and were thereafter quoted by the Court in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204, 217 n.10 (1981). The "stealthy encroachments" phrase was coined in Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). Payton holds that police must have an arrest warrant before they may
enter a suspect's home to arrest him. Steagald holds that before police may enter a third person's
home to arrest a suspect, they must have a search warrant authorizing them to search that home
for the suspect. Boyd held that a subpoena for a person's "private papers" violated interests
protected by the fourth and fifth amendments. Boyd was virtually overruled in the subsequent
decision of Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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ety."' 19 The foremost of such interests, of course, is the individual and socie-
tal interest in preserving the right to privacy in the home from the "stealthy
encroachments" of technology.'1 °
Third, the majority's conclusion, that Ciraolo knowingly exposed his back
yard to view from public airspace, willfully ignores the "qualitative
difference"' 2' between purposeful police surveillance and the casual glance of a
private air passenger:
Travelers on commercial flights, as well as private planes used for
business or personal reasons, normally obtain at most a fleeting,
anonymous, and nondiscriminating glimpse of the landscape and
buildings over which they pass. The risk that a passenger on such a
plane might observe private activities, and might connect those ac-
tivities with particular people, is simply too trivial to protect
against. It is no accident that, as a matter of common experience,
many people build fences around their residential areas, but few
build roofs over their backyards. Therefore, contrary to the Court's
suggestion, ... people do not "knowingly expos[e]" their residen-
tial yards "to the public" merely by failing to build barriers that
prevent aerial surveillance. 122
Noting that the Court's decision "has serious implications for outdoor family
activities conducted in the curtilage of a home,' '123 and decrying the "indis-
criminate nature of aerial surveillance," ' 24 Justice Powell concluded by accus-
ing the majority of ignoring "the longstanding presumption that warrantless
intrusions into the home are unreasonable.' 25
3. Evaluation
The Ciraolo majority's attempt to justify its conclusions in Katzian terms'1
weakens the entire opinion, because the fundamental differences between inter-
ception of communications (at issue in Katz) and the aerial surveillance at is-
sue in Ciraolo renders Katz an imperfect analogy at best. Moreover, calling
119. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Justice Powell asserted that "[slince [the officer) could not see into this private family area from
the street, the Court certainly would agree that he would have conducted an unreasonable search
had he climbed over the fence, or used a ladder to peer into the yard without first securing a
warrant." Id. at 222. The majority, however, probably would not agree that using a ladder would
be a search. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion specifically likened the aerial surveillance
(which it found lawful) to "a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a 2-level bus." Id. at
211.
120. Id. at 217, 220 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 224.
122. Id. at 223-24 (footnote and citation omitted).
123. Id. at 225 n.10.
124. Id. at 225.
125. Id. at 226.
126. Id. at 213 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
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Ciraolo's efforts to shield his back yard from uninvited eyes a "knowing ex-
posure," as the dissent points out, simply ignores reality. 27 Indeed, it is an
example of terminological inexactitude 121 of which even Humpty Dumpty
would be proud.' 29
The dissent also overstates its points somewhat. It is true, for example, that
the Court has (and should) treat subjective privacy expectations in the home
with particular deference. 30  Likewise, since Katz "the manner of
surveillance"' 3 often is no longer the controlling consideration in determining
whether the surveillance constitutes a search. Nevertheless, neither of these
principles are as absolute as Justice Powell implies. 3 2
Moreover, although it would have been more forthright to acknowledge the
factual differences between casual civilian (or police) observation and purpose-
ful police surveillance, the majority was wise in rejecting the constitutional dis-
tinction between the two urged by the dissent. The Court has long insisted
that as long as an officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, it is constitu-
tional regardless of whatever ulterior motive he or she may have had." To
deviate from this principle might have opened up broad new areas of uncer-
tainty in the law.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22 (discussing majority opinion's disregard of dif-
ferences between police surveillance and casual glance by private air passenger).
128. Winston Churchill coined the phrase "terminological inexactitude" in a speech in the
House of Commons, Feb. 22, 1906. BARTLTr's FAmit.&tAS QUOTATIONS 743:5 (15th ed. 1982).
129. That character's pleasure in prevarication is apparently not limited to the realm of fiction:
"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knockdown argument,' " Alice objected. "When I
use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I
choose it to mean-neither more nor less." "The question is," said Alice, "whether
you can make words mean so many different things." "The question is," said
Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."
C.L. DODOSON (Lawis CARROLL), THnouoH THE LOOKING GLASS ch. 6 (1947).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16 (legitimate right to privacy will almost always be
found in subjective privacy expectations in the home).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19 (because constitutionally protected privacy right
is determined by individual interests in free society, manner of surveillance is irrelevant to analy-
sis).
132. An example will illustrate the point. If a police officer hid a camera in a suspect's home
to watch the suspect's conduct at a particular day and time, this clearly would be a search. Sup-
pose instead an undercover officer or informer won the suspect's confidence and secured an invi-
tation into the home, and thus learned what the suspect said and did during the critical period.
The suspect subjectively believed that the "privacy" of his home protected him from government
surveillance. It would be entirely rational for the law to conclude that this expectation is a reason-
able one protected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court, however, has consistently ruled other-
wise. An unbroken line of decisions holds that whenever we confide in someone, for Fourth
Amendment purposes we must "assume the risk" that our confidant is then or later will betray
us. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (individuals have no Fourth Amendment com-
plaint if their confidant is a police informer who reports what he has seen or heard). Thus, the
manner whereby a suspect's at-home activities are discovered still may determine whether the sur-
veillance is a search or not.
133. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136-38 (1978).
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The holding in Ciraolo is simple enough: henceforth an homeowner must
assume the risk, for Fourth Amendment purposes, that his fenced-in yard will
be subjected to naked-eye surveillance from public airspace, at least when that
surveillance is conducted from an altitude of 1,000 feet. This result is entirely
defensible on the grounds that the surveillance neither did nor could have in-
truded upon "the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life,' "14 and therefore intruded upon no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy. Thus, the result is best explained and justified by
reference to the nature of the information the surveillance did, and did not,
reveal.' The Ciraolo majority's failure to give proper emphasis to this factor
is unfortunate. 36
4. Florida v. Riley
In Florida v. Riley, 37 a four-Justice plurality applied the reasoning of Cira-
olo to helicopter surveillance conducted from a height of 400 feet, and con-
cluded that no search had occurred. As in Ciraolo, the Riley Court
mentioned, but failed to adequately discuss, the nature of the information
sought and discovered. 3
E. Image Magnification: The Dow Chemical Case
The case of Dow Chemical Co. v. United States'39 was argued and decided the
same day as Ciraolo.14° The Dow case arose when the Environmental Protection
Administration ("EPA") sought permission to conduct an on-site inspection of a
2,000-acre chemical manufacturing facility operated by Dow in Midland, Michi-
gan. Dow refused permission, so the EPA employed a commercial aerial photog-
rapher to photograph the facility. Claiming that the photographs might reveal
valuable trade secrets that it had gone to considerable lengths to protect (particu-
larly with regard to several open-air plants), Dow brought suit in federal district
court, alleging that the EPA's action constituted a search that violated the
Fourth Amendment. The district court agreed, and granted an injunction.' 4' The
134. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text (back yard may be curtilage to home where,
as is true in Ciraolo, the yard is next to home and surrounded by high, double fence).
135. Justice Powell pointed out that aerial surveillance at an altitude of 1,000 feet revealed a
swimming pool and sun deck. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 216 (Powell, J., dissenting). But
it is difficult to imagine that naked-eye surveillance from such a distance would permit the offi-
cers to observe any "intimate activity."
136. See infra notes 201-217 and accompanying text (surveillance of intimate activity within
home through use of commonly available and high quality equipment might not constitute search).
137. 57 U.S.L.W. 4126 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1989) (No. 87-764) (plurality opinion).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 226-33 (discussing Riley decision in detail).
139. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
140. The cases were argued on December 10, 1985, and decided on May 19, 1986.
141. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982). Dow also argued
that the photography constituted a "taking" of property without due process in violation of the
fifth amendment, and that the EPA lacked statutory authority to conduct the surveillance. The
district court dismissed the fifth amendment claim without prejudice, and concluded that the EPA
had exceeded its statutory authority. The Supreme Court, however, unanimously upheld the EPA's
conduct under the statutory issue. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. at 234.
[Vol. 26:315
ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,'4 2 and Dow appealed.
Dow, like Ciraolo and Riley, poses questions concerning the applicability of
the Fourth Amendment to aerial surveillance. The cases differ, however, in
two significant respects. First, unlike the naked-eye surveillance in Ciraolo and
Riley, the Dow surveillance was conducted with an aerial mapping camera that
recorded on film far more than an observer in the plane could have seen with
the naked eye. Thus, the surveillance in Dow was far more revealing than that
in Ciraolo and Riley. Second, while Ciraolo and Riley involved surveillance of
a curtilage of a private home, Dow involved surveillance of a huge multi-
building industrial complex.'
3
To support its claim that it had a Fourth Amendment right to privacy from
aerial photography, Dow argued that the open spaces within the complex con-
stituted an "industrial curtilage" protected by the Fourth Amendment,1' 4 par-
ticularly since it had "done everything commercially feasible to protect the
confidential business information and property located within the borders of
the facility.' 4 5 The Court in Dow focused most of its Fourth Amendment
attention on the question of whether the Dow complex should be likened to
residential curtilage or an open field. A five-to-four majority opinion written
by Chief Justice Burger, 146 concluded that "for purposes of aerial surveil-
lance," the latter analogy was more apt,' 47 and rejected Dow's claim.
142. 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984).
143. The 2,000-acre complex contains numerous chemical processing plants, several of which are
"open-air" plants, with reactor equipment, loading and storage facilities, motors, and other equip-
ment located in the open area between buildings. Dow claimed that the technology used in these
plants are trade secrets protected by law, and that aerial photographs of the design and configura-
tion of its open-air facilities could reveal details of its secret manufacturing processes. Dow Chem.
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. at 230.
144. Federal and state trade secret laws protect it from unauthorized disclosure of the informa-
tion in question, the company pointed out. By enacting such legislation, Dow reasoned, society
had recognized as "reasonable" the company's expectation of privacy from surveillance that might
disclose the information in question. Id. at 232.
145. Id. at 241 (Powell, J., dissenting). Entrance to the plant is strictly regulated. An eight-foot
high chain link fence completely surrounds the facility. The fence is patrolled by security person-
nel, monitored by closed-circuit television, motion detectors and other alarm systems. The open-air
plants are placed within the internal portion of the complex, to shield them from public view
from outside the perimeter fence. Use of photographic equipment within the complex by anyone
other than authorized Dow personnel is prohibited, and no photographs of the facility may be
taken or released without prior management review and approval. Id. at 241-42 (Powell, J., dis-
senting). The District Court found that all told, Dow had spent at least $3.25 million on various
security measures in each of the ten years preceding the litigation. Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 536 F. Supp. at 1365.
146. Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor joined Chief Justice Burger's majority
opinion. Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, dissented from the
majority's Fourth Amendment analysis.
147. The majority acknowledged that commercial property, like residential property, is protected
by the Fourth Amendment from unreasonable searches and seizures. Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. at 235. Still, the Chief Justice insisted, commercial property enjoys less protection
than an individual's home, because the expectation of privacy in such property " 'differs signifi-
cantly from the sanctity afforded an individual's home' " or residential curtilage. Id. at 237-38
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The Dow case involved more than simple aerial surveillance, however. A
commercial aerial photographer hired by the EPA utilized an aerial mapping
camera to photograph Dow's facility at altitudes ranging from 1,200 feet to
12,000 feet. The camera cost more than $22,000, was mounted to the floor
inside the aircraft, and produced photographs that permitted depth perception
and enlargement to a dramatic degree without significant loss of detail or res-
olution. 14' Thus, " 'the camera saw a great deal more than the human eye
could ever see' from the same vantage point. 149 Surveillance this intrusive,
the district court had held, must be considered a search. 5 0 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court devoted considerable attention to the surveillance technology
employed by the EPA. In the process, it provided its most explicit discussion
to date of the application of the Fourth Amendment to surveillance technol-
ogy.
1. The Sophistication of Surveillance
"In common with much else," the Dow majority observed, "the technology
of photography has changed in this century. These developments have en-
hanced industrial processes, and indeed all areas of life; they have also en-
hanced law enforcement techniques."'' Early in the opinion, the Court
described the equipment used to photograph the Dow facility as "a standard
floor-mounted, precision aerial mapping camera."'5 2 The Court stated that
"[a]ny person with an airplane and an aerial camera could readily duplicate
[the photographs]""' 3-a comment that has received well-deserved ridicule. 4
Near the end of its explanation of why the Dow complex was (for aerial sur-
veillance purposes) an open field rather than a curtilage, the majority opinion
explained why the capabilities of the equipment did not, under the facts, raise
independent Fourth Amendment issues:
EPA was not employing some unique sensory device that, for exam-
ple, could penetrate the walls of buildings and record conversations
(quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981)). The Court acknowledged that "la]ny
actual physical entry by EPA into any enclosed area would raise significantly different questions."
Id. at 237. Justice Powell, dissenting, accused the majority of grossly misrepresenting the Court's
prior decisions applying the Fourth Amendment to commercial premises. Id. at 246 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Similarly, the dissent condemned the majority's emphasis on the lack of physical en-
try.
148. Id. at 242 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 243 (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. at 1367).
150. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. at 1367-68.
151. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. at 231.
152. Id. at 229; see supra text accompanying notes 148-49 (describing capabilities of camera in
question).
153. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. at 231.
154. For example, Professor Yale Kamisar has quipped that "any 'Joe Sixpack' with an air-
plane and a $22,000 camera-purchased perhaps at the local K-Mart?-could readily duplicate
these photos." 55 U.S.L.W. 2235 (Oct. 28, 1986). Had the majority simply said "anyone with the
necessary funds could have hired an aerial photographer," it would have made its point and
avoided the ridicule.
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in Dow's plants, offices or laboratories, but rather a conventional,
albeit precise, commercial camera commonly used in map-mak-
ing .... It may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveil-
lance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance
equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite
technology, might be constitutionally prescribed absent a warrant.
But the photographs here are not so revealing of intimate details as
to raise constitutional concerns. Although they undoubtedly give
EPA more detailed information than naked-eye views, they remain
limited to an outline of the facility's buildings and equipment. The
mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the
degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems. An elec-
tronic device to penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and rec-
ord confidential discussions of chemical formulae or other trade
secrets would raise very different and far more serious ques-
tions . . .
The Dow dissent criticized this passage on several grounds. First, Justice
Powell protested that "[t]hese observations shed no light on the antecedent
question whether Dow had a reasonable expectation of privacy." He argued
that since Katz, Fourth Amendment rights have been measured "by reference
to the privacy interests that a free society recognizes as reasonable, not by
reference to the method of surveillance used in the particular case."'15 6 Second,
the dissent expressed grave concerns about the implications of the majority's
approach to scientifically enhanced surveillance: "If the Court's observations
were to become the basis of a new Fourth Amendment standard that would
replace the rule in Katz, privacy rights would be seriously at risk as technolog-
ical advances become generally disseminated and available in our society."'' 57
Finally, Justice Powell argued that the majority's distinctions in the sophisti-
cation of technology still did not justify the majority's resolution of the case:
"Satellite photography hardly could have been more informative about Dow's
technology" than the aerial photography proved to be.' Seeking to dramatize
the intrusive nature of the photography, the dissent emphasized that "the pho-
tographs revealed details 'as small as 1/2 inch in diameter.' ",5 In a footnote,
the majority responded that
155. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. at 238-39. The Court concluded the paragraph
by noting that "other protections such as trade secret laws" protect businesses against private
surveillance by competitors. Id. at 239.
156. Id. at 251 (Powell, J., dissenting). Although as a general proposition this is so, its scope is
limited by the "knowing exposure" and "assumption of risk" concepts. See supra notes 25-35
and accompanying text (discussing two-prong Katz test). Indeed, the majority justified the results
in Ciraolo on the theory that the appellant had "knowingly exposed" his property to aerial sur-
veillance. See supra notes 96-111 and accompanying text (discussing Ciraolo opinion concerning
expectations of privacy).
157. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. at 251 (Powell, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 251 n.13.
159. Id. (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. at 1357).
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[tihe ... dissent emphasizes ... that under magnification power
lines as small as 1/2-inch can be observed. But a glance at the pho-
tographs in issue shows that those lines are observable only because
of their stark contrast with the snow-white background. No objects
as small as 1/2-inch diameter such as a class ring, for example, are
recognizable, nor are there any identifiable human faces or secret
documents captured in such a fashion as to implicate more serious
privacy concerns. Fourth Amendment cases must be decided on the
facts of each case, not by extravagant generalizations. "[W]e have
never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy
constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment." On
these facts, nothing in these photographs suggests that any reasona-
ble expectations of privacy have been infringed.16
2. Measures and Countermeasures
To support its claim that the surveillance had infringed a constitutionally
protected expectation of privacy, Dow argued that it had taken elaborate pre-
cautions to protect itself against aerial surveillance that might reveal the com-
pany's trade secrets. 61 As a matter of standard company practice, employees
are instructed to note the identification number of any "suspicious" over-
flights of the facility. When such flights occur, the company locates the pilot
to determine if he had photographed the facility and, if so, requests the pho-
tographer to turn over the film. If the pilot complies, Dow develops the film
and reviews the photographs. If they reveal private business information, Dow
retains the photographs and negatives. If the pilot refuses to cooperate, Dow
commences litigation to protect its trade secrets. 62
Thus, Dow argued, it did all that it could reasonably be expected to do to
protect its facility from aerial photography. The only other alternative would
be to place a roof over its open-air facilities. This, the company insisted,
would be unreasonable for two reasons. First, it would be prohibitively expen-
sive: to roof just one such plant in 1978 would have cost approximately $15
million. Second, it would greatly increase the danger to employees if explosive
or toxic chemicals were released accidentally. 63
The Court, however, dismissed Dow's anti-aerial surveillance procedures as
being beneath serious discussion, stating that Dow " 'did not take any precau-
160. Id. at 239 n.5 (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984)).
161. To merit Fourth Amendment protection, a person (or corporation) must show that police
surveillance intruded upon an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and that society recognizes
that expectation as reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., con-
curring); see supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Harlan's formula). Dow
hoped to persuade the Court that its countermeasures against aerial surveillance evinced an actual
expectation of privacy in satisfaction of the first prong of Katz.
162. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. at 242 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 240 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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tions against aerial intrusions.' "4 Noting that the plant is near an airport
and within frequently used landing and takeoff patterns, 65 Chief Justice
Burger concluded that "[slimply keeping track of the identification numbers of
any planes flying overhead, with a later follow-up to see if photographs were
taken, does not constitute a 'procedur[e] designed to protect the facility from
aerial photography.' "166
The majority did not respond directly to Dow's claim that no more protec-
tive countermeasures were feasible. The holding in Dow nonetheless contains
an unequivocal rejection of this claim. The cost of privacy from aerial surveil-
lance of this sort, the Court indicated silently but clearly, is a roof. If Dow
was unwilling or unable to pay the price, it would simply have to forgo the
privacy.
F. Evaluation
It is axiomatic that a-physical entry onto a private premises absent consent
is a search that usually must be authorized by a search warrant. This is so
whether the officers' purpose is to look for evidence,167 to look for an individ-
ual,'6 or to install an electronic surveillance device.16 9 In the 1980's, the Su-
preme Court has on several occasions been called upon to determine when the
Fourth Amendment should apply to technologically enhanced visual surveil-
lance (or a functional equivalent) conducted without a physical entry. Ciraolo
holds that it is not a search for police officers to conduct naked-eye surveil-
lance of a private, Fourth Amendment-protected place, so long as the officers
have not physically entered the private location and their observation point is
somewhere the officers have a right to be. 70 The Brown,' 7' Dunn, 72 Knotts, 73
164. Id. at 237 n.4 (quoting with approval Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 312
(6th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added)). Footnote 4 of the Dow majority opinion also quotes approv-
ingly the Sixth Circuit's observation that " '[i]f elaborate and expensive measures for ground se-
curity show that Dow has an actual expectation of privacy in ground security, . . . then taking no
measure for aerial security should say something about its actual privacy expectation in being free
from aerial observation.' " Id. (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d at 312 (em-
phasis in original)).
165. Dow did not deliberately choose to locate its facility near an airport-it had been manu-
facturing chemicals at that site since the 1890's. Id. at 240 (Powell, J., dissenting). The first suc-
cessful airplane flight occurred in 1903.
166. Id. at 237 n.4 (citations omitted).
167. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
168. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
169. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
170. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text (police have right of aerial surveillance).
171. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing decision in Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730 (1983)).
172. See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text (discussing decision in United States v.
Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1984)).
173. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (discussing decision in United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)).
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Karo7 4 and Dow' 7 decisions hold that it likewise is not a search for law en-
forcement officers to use artificial means, ranging in sophistication from a
simple flashlight to state-of-the-art aerial photography, to observe locations or
conduct that are public in nature, 76 or are "knowingly exposed to the pub-
lic,'" 17 or are at least more akin to an "industrial open field" than to the
curtilage of a private home. 78 Karo holds that it does, however, constitute a
search to employ an electronic device to "see" whether a miniature transmitter
is inside a private premises or location.
7 9
Once we move beyond these holdings, certainty as to the interplay between
enhanced visual surveillance and the Fourth Amendment is hard to come by.
Any attempt at analysis must, however, begin with the Court's most detailed
discussion of the subject to date: the "high technology" paragraphs and foot-
note in Dow.10
1. The Comparison with Eavesdropping
The Dow Court began by pointing out that the "EPA was not employing
some unique device that, for example, could penetrate the walls of buildings
and record conversations" that occur inside,' 8' and ended its "hi-tech" discus-
sion with the observation that use of such a device "would raise very different
and far more serious questions."'IR That the Court begins and ends its discus-
sion of visual surveillance technology in this fashion is noteworthy for two
reasons.
First, while analogies to electronic eavesdropping are natural enough, the in-
herent differences between eavesdropping and enhanced visual surveillance re-
duce such analogies to only marginal usefulness. Several differences exist.
First, visual and aural surveillance seek to discover significantly different
things. The former focuses on appearance, location and movement, while the
latter focuses on speech. Second, technology aside, the former can be con-
ducted at far greater distances than the latter; light travels farther than sound.
Third, again putting technology aside, it is sometimes easier to take measures
against visual than aural surveillance. Even the thinnest wall prevents others
174. See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text (discussing decision in United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705 (1984)).
175. See supra text accompanying note 155 (discussing decision in Dow).
176. Thus, in Knotts and Karo the Court held that movement on the public highways are not
protected by the Fourth Amendment from electronic beeper surveillance. See supra notes 69-74,
82-85 and accompanying text (discussing constitutionality of police use of beepers).
177. Such as, in Brown, those portions of the passenger compartment of an automobile that are
visible to a passer-by.
178. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (distinguishing between industrial and resi-
dential curtilage).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 75-81 (discussing Karo holding and private location
monitoring).
180. See supra notes 151-56, 160 and accompanying text (discussing sophistication of available
technology).
181. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 1985).
182. Id. at 239.
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from seeing what we do. Yet, as anyone who as spent time in an inexpensive
motel (to cite one example) can attest, walls do not necessarily prevent others
from hearing what we say or do.
Perhaps the biggest difference between visual surveillance and aural surveil-
lance, however, is that the latter simply seems to offend our deeply held val-
ues more than the former. It boils down to an assessment of which
expectations of privacy society is and is not willing to accept as reasonable. 1 3
There is a built-in acceptance that where we go and what we doi except be-
hind closed doors, simply is not "private." It is not as private, at any rate, as
what we say to others-even if the conversation occurs in public, so long as
there are no uninvited listeners within earshot.
The Court's comparison of image magnification to electronic eavesdropping
is noteworthy for a second reason. The technology discussion ends with the
comment that use of a device that "could penetrate the walls of buildings and
record conversations" that occur inside "would raise very different and more
serious questions."'1' In fact, however, any "questions" raised by such surveil-
lance were answered - conclusively in the 1967 decision of Katz v. United
States. Katz holds that when a person is in a location where he enjoys a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, the use of an eavesdropping device to surrepti-
tiously overhear or record what he says is a search, regardless of whether
investigators physically intruded into a "constitutionally protected area."' 85
Moreover, this would be true whether the sensory device the investigators util-
ized was "unique," was merely "uncommon" (a sophisticated parabolic mi-
crophone, for example), ' 6 or was available at any electronics or department
store (for example, a miniature cassette tape recorder).8 7
Given that the Dow majority was aware of the holding in Katz, there is no
indication that the majority is seeking to overturn that holding. Thus, the
phrase "would raise different and serious questions" is probably nothing more
183. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Amendment's protections).
184. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. at 239.
185. See supra notes 21-23 (discussing holding of Katz).
186. See supra note 65 (providing similar example by Karo Court).
187. It does not constitute a search, however, to use a device to overhear or record a conversa-
tion with the consent of a participant in the conversation. See supra note 31 and accompanying
text (discussing "assumption of risk" doctrine that encounter with police informant or undercover
agent raises no Fourth Amendment implications). Nor, perhaps, would it be a search to use such
a device to intercept a conversation held in the open. Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz, observed
that
a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects,
activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not
"protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the
other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being over-
heard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). The
majority in Ciraolo quoted this language approvingly in justifying its conclusion that Ciraolo.
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 214 (1985).
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than sloppy draftsmanship.',, Probably the majority was attempting to make
the point that photographic surveillance of the shapes of buildings (even build-
ings shielded from ground-level view) simply cannot compare in intrusiveness
to electronic surveillance of conversations held indoors. A further point was
that the rule enunciated in Katz which governs eavesdropping provides only
limited guidance in assessing the Fourth Amendment implications of technolog-
ically enhanced visual surveillance. 89
2. Sophistication and "General Availability"
The Court's remark in Dow that a warrant might be required to authorize
surveillance of private property with "highly sophisticated surveillance equip-
ment not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology" also
prompts numerous questions. ' 9° Aerial photography of the sort employed in
Dow, according to the majority, fails both tests. It is "generally available"
enough to permit a private citizen to hire a photographer for a few hundred
dollars, and is also not "highly sophisticated" enough.' 9l
Beyond this specific holding, however, uncertainty multiplies. How "not
generally available" and how "highly sophisticated" must the equipment be
for its use to constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment? What is the
proportional significance of the two factors of "general availability" and
188. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text (discussing similar examples in Ciraolo deci-
sion).
189. Indeed, the Ciraolo opinion makes the same basic point. The dissent in Ciraolo begins by
quoting Justice Harlan's warning, in his Katz concurrence, that to interpret the Fourth Amend-
ment as "proscribing only physical intrusions by police onto private property 'is, in the present
day, bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by
electronic as well as physical invasion.' " California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215-16 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). The
Ciraolo majority responded that
Justice Harlan's observations about future electronic interference with private com-
munications were plainly not aimed at simple visual observations from a public
place....
Justice Harlan made it crystal clear that he was resting on the reality that one who
enters a telephone booth is entitled to assume that his conversation is not being in-
tercepted. This does not translate readily into a rule of constitutional dimensions that
one who grows illicit drugs in his backyard is "entitled to assume" his unlawful
conduct will not be observed by a passing aircraft-or by a power company repair
mechanic on a pole overlooking the yard ...
One can reasonably doubt that in 1967 Justice Harlan considered an aircraft within
the category of future "electronic" developments that could stealthily intrude upon
an individual's privacy.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214-15 (citation omitted).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55 (discussing Dow majority's observations). Pre-
liminarily, it is worth noting that to speak in terms of whether a warrant "might be" required
omits the intermediate step of determining whether a surveillance technique constitutes a search at
all. In recent years the Court has expanded somewhat the categories of searches that may be
conducted without a warrant, or even without probable cause.
191. Id.; Dow Chem. Co. v. United States. 476 U.S. at 231.
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"high sophistication"? How do we measure whether or when such technology
has become "generally available"?'" 2 Once such technology does become "gen-
erally available," would it no longer be considered a search to use it, even if
the technology remains "highly sophisticated"? And when today's "highly so-
phisticated surveillance equipment" is supplanted by tomorrow's "new and im-
proved" technology, will "the people" lose their Fourth Amendment "right
... to be secure, in their ... houses" and elsewhere, from surveillance em-
ploying such equipment?
"What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." 191 Is technology the
only factor to be considered in defining "knowing exposure"? Does it auto-
matically follow that surveillance with equipment that is not "highly sophisti-
cated" (as the Court used that phrase in Dow), or that is "generally available
to the public," is not a search, and therefore may be used without a warrant
or other Fourth Amendment restraints?
Dow does not explicitly address these issues. But unless some additional fac-
tor effects the equation, that decision implies that the answer to all of these
questions is a simple "yes." This result would seriously endanger privacy in a
wide range of circumstances.
An additional factor is, in fact, struggling to emerge. There are hints of it
in Ciraolo and Riley, and something more than hints in Dow. That factor is
the nature of the information sought and discovered by the surveillance.
IV. EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY: THE INFORMATION SOUGHT AND OBTAINED
Fourth Amendment analysis traditionally treats privacy as an all-or-nothing
proposition. Under this approach, an intrusion is an intrusion, whether it re-
veals intimate details of a person's life or, by contrast, only a serial number
on a piece of stereo equipment."' On the other hand, any "knowing expo-
sure" of information to the public in effect waives Fourth Amendment protec-
tion from purposeful police surveillance of a similar kind, even if the exposure
in question is far more theoretical than real.191
In the real world, however, privacy often is not an all-or-nothing proposi-
tion. It is a matter of degree, and the degree to which our sense of propriety
is offended by surveillance, if at all, depends at least as much upon what is
revealed, as upon how it is revealed. If a police officer, seeking to learn
whether my car is in the garage attached to my home, lies down in my drive-
192. Satellite photography, which the Court cited in Dow as the epitome of "high sophistica-
tion," is already available to private news organizations. Private Cameras in Space Stir U.S. Secu-
rity Fears, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1987, at Cl, col. 3; Why Newsmen Should Treat a Little
Heavenly Help with Care, Fin. Times, July 16, 1987, at 117; "Mediasats": Issue with No Easy
Answers, L.A. Times, June 1, 1987, at 5 (Metro, pt. 2), col. 1.
193. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
194. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987). This decision, in its exaltation of overly techni-
cal niceties over common sense, must rank among the very silliest decisions in the Court's history.
195. See supra text accompanying note 122 (discussing difference between purposeful police sur-
veillance and casual glance of private air passenger in concept of knowing exposure).
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way and shines his flashlight through the half-inch gap between the bottom of
the garage door and the garage floor, I would be annoyed somewhat by his
choice of method, but my ultimate reaction would be, "So what's the big
deal?" What I think of as my "privacy" has not really been invaded, even
though, as an attorney, I know that the garage is within the curtilage of my
home and that the officer's conduct may have violated the Fourth Amend-
ment. I would be far more offended if the police subpoenaed a list of the
movies I have rented from the local video store or the books I have checked
out at the public library. In terms of values, what I choose to watch or read
in the privacy of my own home should be a concern only to me. I would feel
this way even though I realize that by "knowingly exposing" my choice of
movies to the video store or my choice of books to the library, I have "as-
sumed the risk"'9 that this information will be shared with the authorities.'9
In Ciraolo, and even more so in Dow, the Court included the nature of the
information sought and discovered as a factor to be considered in deciding
when enhanced surveillance constitutes a search. Knotts and Karo are consis-
tent with this approach, while Dunn may not be.
A. The Ciraolo and Dow Chemical Decisions
In On Lee v. United States,19 a pre-Katz case involving an informant
"wired" with a transmitter, the Court commented gratuitously that "[t]he use
of bifocals, field glasses or the telescope to magnify the object of a witness'
vision is not a forbidden search or seizure, even if they focus without his
knowledge or consent upon what one supposes to be private indiscretions."'
Federal and state courts consistently hold likewise, where the activity under
surveillance is public conduct, even if it is obvious that the suspect hopes he is
not being watched.2 °
As several federal and state courts have recognized, however, different issues
arise if the behavior being observed occurs in private. Several courts have
held, for example, that it is a search for police officers to use binoculars or a
telescope to look into the window of a house or apartment, where no compa-
rable view is available to a lawfully positioned naked-eye observer.201 Since
196. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (addressing assumption of risk limitations on
Fourth Amendment protection).
197. I am not suggesting that the nature of the information sought or obtained should, as a
general proposition, supplant or supplement the current Fourth Amendment focus on location-
oriented privacy. I merely point out that the Fourth Amendment sometimes protects privacies
about which many of us do not care much and often does not protect against disclosures that
offend or embarrass.
198. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
199. Id. at 754.
200. See I W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 2.2(c) (discussing use of binoculars or telescope to
conduct search).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976) (use of 800x60 milli-
meter telescope to see into apartment window from closest building to defendant's building one
quarter mile away constitutes search); I W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 2.2(c) (collected cases ad-
dressing same issue).
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binoculars and other such articles are "readily available to the general public"
and may not be considered "highly sophisticated," it is uncertain whether
such holdings survive Ciraolo and Dow.202
Suppose, for example, that police officers use a high-quality thirty-five milli-
meter camera and a telephoto lens (available at any camera store for $1,000
or less) from an altitude of 1,000 feet to photograph someone sitting inside a
suspected cocaine dealer's fenced-in, Ciraolo-like curtilage. Enlarging the nega-
tive in a darkroom, the photo reveals the suspect, sitting at a patio table,
weighing a package of white powder. Use of the camera, lens and enlarger
magnifies the intrusiveness of the surveillance. Does it do so sufficiently to
classify the photography as a search?
Ciraolo provides no direct answer, but the Court hinted strongly that such
photography might constitute a search. In rejecting the dissent's assertion that
its decision contradicted the "reasonable expectation of privacy" formula that
has defined the scope of the Fourth Amendment since Katz, Chief Justice
Burger's majority opinion in Ciraolo stressed that aside from the use of the
airplane, no technology at all was employed:
In an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways
is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his mari-
juana plants were constitutionally protected from being observed
with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet. The Fourth
Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in the pub-
lic airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe
what is visible to the naked eye.203
In a footnote to this passage, the Court noted that "[tihe State acknowledges
that '[a]erial observation of curtilage may become invasive . . . through mod-
ern technology which discloses to the senses those intimate associations, ob-
jects or activities otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow citizens.' "204
Similarly, in Dow the same five-Justice majority conceded that photographs
revealing intimate details might raise constitutional concerns. 205 The photo-
graphs might raise such concerns, apparently, even in a location like the Dow
facility which the Court compared to an open field for purposes of aerial sur-
veillance. 206 Although it offered no direct definition of an "intimate detail" in
202. They should, and perhaps do. See infra notes 203-08, 221-25 and accompanying text (ap-
plying Ciraolo and Dow holdings).
203. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986); see supra notes 105-06 and accompanying
text (aerial photograph not at issue in Ciraolo but significant in Dow).
204. Id. at 215 n.3 (citation omitted).
205. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986); see supra text accompanying
note 155 (providing quote of "hi-tech" surveillance discussion in Dow). It is uncertain whether the
Court is suggesting that all surveillance photographs of private property that reveal intimate details
would raise constitutional concerns, or whether such concerns would be raised only if the photo-
graphs were taken with "highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the
public." Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. at 238.
206. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. at 239.
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its "technology" footnote, 207 the majority acknowledged that photographs per-
mitting recognition of objects as small as one-half inch in diameter such as a
class ring, identifiable human faces, or secret documents might implicate more
serious privacy concerns. 2°s
Returning to the hypothetical proposed two paragraphs earlier, bags of
white powder and drug packaging paraphernalia presumably also qualify as in-
timate details, recognition of which, like the suspect's identifiable human face,
would implicate serious privacy concerns.209 However, it is still unclear whether
the majority would consider those privacy concerns to be implicated to a sig-
nificant degree if the camera, lens and enlarger, though of excellent quality,
are more "generally available" than, and are not as "highly sophisticated" as,
satellite photography or other state-of-the-art equipment .
2
10
B. The Knotts, Karo and Dunn Decisions
Knotts and Karo, which concern tracking devices, are consistent with the
Ciraolo-Dow emphasis on the nature of the information revealed as a factor
to be considered in assessing whether technologically enhanced surveillance is a
search. Knotts simply holds that it is not a search to monitor electronically the
route a person travels on the public highways, information which is knowingly
exposed to the public. 21' Karo holds that it is a search to monitor electroni-
cally the presence of a physical object inside a house or other private loca-
tion, 2 2 or information "that could not have been visually verified." 2 3
207. Id. at 239 n.6.
208. Id. at 239 n.5.
209. This hypothetical is distinguishable from the facts involved in United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696 (1983) (exposing suspect's luggage to trained narcotics detection dog does not constitute
search of luggage), and United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (conducting chemical test
on quantity of powder does not constitute search of the powder). In each of those cases, the
Court held that an investigative technique that reveals only the presence or absence of contraband
is not a search. The Court reasoned that since there is no right to possess contraband drugs at
all, there is no right to possess them privately, and the limited information revealed by these
procedures did not intrude into privacy rights that are protected. The aerial photographs hypothe-
sized in the text, by contrast, do not reveal the presence or absence of contraband. The bags of
powder probably contain contraband, but we do not know that with the same degree of certainty
as the dog or chemical test would reveal. The photographs, however, do reveal other facts, such
as the fact that the defendant is sitting in the yard apparently packaging something.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 66-74 (discussing police use of beepered container to
locate suspect after having lost sight of him).
211. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); see supra text accompanying note 79 (ad-
dressing indiscriminate monitoring of property).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85 (Karo holding explicitly applicable to locations
other than private residences whefe recognized privacy expectation exists).
213. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984); see supra note 81 and accompanying text
(use of beeper distinguished from facts in Knotts). If Karo's chemical container had been located
in a Ciraolo-like back yard and was visible to naked-eye surveillance from navigable airspace,
Ciraolo makes clear that such surveillance would not constitute a search. The container's very
visibility would preclude its being classified as an "intimate detail." If, however, its presence
could be verified only by use of binoculars or image-magnifying photography, we would be back
in the Ciraolo-Dow uncertainty again.
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The Dunn decision, by contrast, fits less comfortably in this analysis. If no
curtains cover the window to a sidewalk-level apartment, no search occurs
when a police officer glances through the window and spots incriminating evi-
dence inside.214 Now, suppose curtains -cover the window. Although there is a
gap in the curtains, someone standing outside cannot see in because the gap is
so small that not enough daylight from outside gets through to illuminate the
room. If a police officer shines his flashlight through the gap, however, he
can see the contents of the room. Would this window be classified as "essen-
tially open" and therefore as constitutionally unprotected as Dunn's imper-
fectly screened barn door?21
There is, of course, an obvious distinction between Dunn's barn and the
window of a house or apartment. Homes enjoy greater Fourth Amendment
protection than business locations, even assuming the barn is within the pro-
tection afforded to the latter. Still, "what a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection.' '216 Given the ready availability of flashlights, like it or not
we "assume the risk'2 17 that anyone (including a police officer) who wishes to
do so can shine a flashlight through an imperfectly curtained window.
C. Evaluation
Whether visual exposure is a risk that the Fourth Amendment requires us to
assume, however, is another question. To answer it properly, we must consider
values and norms as well as the practical realities of life.218 In Dunn, the
Court neither considered those values and norms, nor attempted to answer the
underlying question. There was, perhaps, no real need to do so because a
barn is not a home. Still, Dunn does little to undercut a broad interpretation
of the passage in Brown that it may well be that "the use of artificial means
to illuminate a darkened area"-any darkened area-"simply does not consti-
tute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth Amendment protection. 2 1 9
But this sweeps too broadly. Dunn's application of the Brown formula to
an imperfectly curtained barn entrance already stretches the "knowing expo-
sure" concept beyond its natural limits. Applied to the almost-but-not-quite-
perfectly curtained residential window, the Brown-Dunn formula would violate
"understandings" and deeply held values "that are recognized and permitted
by society." 20
214. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
215. United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1141 (1987); see supra note 55 and accompanying
text (discussing search in Dunn context).
216. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351.
217. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing concept of knowing exposure).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 27, 34-35 (discussing possible normative considerations
in applying knowing exposure and assumption of risk doctrines).
219. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 (1983) (plurality opinion); see supra notes 42-59 and
accompanying text (discussing use of artificial illumination in context of Fourth Amendment).
220. The quoted phrase is from Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1979).
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Ciraolo and Dow, on the other hand, are less susceptible to overly broad
application, precisely because the Court in each case focused on what was ob-
served, as well as upon the equipment that was used. Concededly, Chief
Justice Burger's opinions in Ciraolo and Dow deserve much of the criticism
levelled at them forcefully and almost mockingly in Justice Powell's dissents.
221
The majority could have done a better job of explaining and defending its
reasoning. 222
Nevertheless, it is the Dow-Ciraolo majority, not the dissent, that properly
focused on the facts of each case, and not on extravagant generalizations.n 3
In several respects, Ciraolo, and even more so Dow, are cases of first impres-
sion in which the Court took care to limit its holdings. If the limits are less
clear than we would like them to be, perhaps that is understandable, given the
largely uncharted territory of law and technology into which the Court was
venturing.2
Setting the shortcomings of the Dow-Ciraolo majority opinions aside, one
can only find that the Court decided correctly. It would offend common sense
for a person to have a right to privacy with regard to a ten-foot high plant
that is cultivated out-of-doors, the illegal character of which could be recog-
nized by a trained observer's naked-eye view from a thousand feet away. Sim-
ilarly, it would offend common sense for a chemical company to have a right
to privacy in the very size and shape of large industrial structures. Law that
flies in the face of common sense is rarely good law. The decisions in Ciraolo
and Dow are consistent with common sense.
There is, of course, a drawback. Determining when visual surveillance (or its
scientific equivalent) constitutes a "search" would be a complex enough task
if technology was the only "non-traditional" factor. Including the nature of
the information sought and obtained in the equation adds an additional layer
of complexity which would be highly subjective and unpredictable at least until
the Court provides further amplification. Lower courts will have to speculate
as to whether it is a search, for example, to use binoculars to view a mari-
juana plant-or an identifiable face-in a Ciraolo-like back yard or apartment
window.
No doubt the Court will have ample opportunities to resolve such difficult
questions. The time to formulate "extravagant generalizations" will come (if
at all) after the Court and Congress22 have had additional opportunities to
221. This is not to suggest that the dissents are free of lapses here and there. See supra notes
130-32 and accompanying text (discussing pit-falls in Ciraolo dissenting opinion).
222. See supra notes 126-29, 156-60 and accompanying text (reviewing specific criticisms).
223. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986); see supra text accompany-
ing note 160 (providing example of detailed factual considerations by majority).
224. It is also likely that the Dow and Ciraolo decisions speak less clearly than some members
of the majority would like because, had they pressed too hard, other members of the majority
might have gone over to the dissent.
225. The Court's reticence to apply "extravagant generalizations" is praiseworthy for another
reason. Deciding where to draw the line between police efficiency and protection of privacy is
ultimately a value judgment; and Congress, not the Court, is the primary definer of social values.
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ponder the application of the Fourth Amendment to visual surveillance tech-
nology.
D. Postscript: Florida v. Riley
In Florida v. Riley,2 decided as this Article went to press, a four-Justice
plurality, like the Ciraolo and Dow majorities, suggested in passing that
whether technologically enhanced surveillance should be classified as a search
might depend in part upon whether the surveillance revealed "intimate details
connected with the use of the home or curtilage.1 2 7 Riley, like Ciraolo, in-
volved aerial surveillance of marijuana cultivation. The cases differed factually
only in that: (i) in Riley, the marijuana was observed through openings in the
roof and sides of a greenhouse within the curtilage of a home, rather than in
a fenced-in back yard within the curtilage of a home; and (ii) the officers in
Riley were in a helicopter flying at 400 feet, not a fixed-wing aircraft at 1,000
feet. A bare majority concluded that this did not constitute a search. 228
Dissenting, Justice Brennan derided the concept that the nature of the activ-
ity observed must be "intimate" to be protected by the Constitution: "What,
one wonders, is meant by 'intimate details'? If the police had observed Riley
embracing his wife in the backyard greenhouse, would we then say that his
For the Court to have handed down a broad constitutional rule might have precluded, or at least
dissuaded, Congress from considering the issue.
226. 57 U.S.L.W. 4126 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1989) (No. 87-764) (plurality opinion).
227. Justice White's plurality opinion concludes:
[There is no] intimation here that the helicopter interfered with respondent's normal
use of the greenhouse or other parts of the curtilage. As far as this record reveals,
no intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed,
and there was no undue noise, no wind, dust, or threat of injury. In these circum-
stances, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 4127 (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Kennedy, JJ.).
228. The four-Justice plurality concluded that, at least in the absence of disclosure of "intimate
details," the fact that surveillance was conducted from public airspace at an altitude within Fed-
eral Aviation Administration ("FAA") safety guidelines was dispositive, Id. at 4127 & n.2. Justice
O'Connor, concurring in the result, criticised the plurality for relying "too heavily" on FAA re-
gulations to resolve Fourth Amendment issues. The important question, she insisted, was "whether
the helicopter was . .. at an altitude at which members of the public travel with sufficient regu-
larity" to render Riley's expectation of privacy from aerial observation unreasonable. Id. at 4128
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment because
Riley had offered no evidence on this topic, thereby failing to satisfy the defendant's burden of
proof at a suppression hearing. Id. The four dissenting Justices likewise decried the plurality's
reliance on FAA regulations. Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall and Stevens joined,
asserted that aerial surveillance from a 400-foot altitude was unreasonable per se. Id. at 4131
(Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ.). Justice Blackmun, dissenting sepa-
rately, argued that the state, not the defendant, had the burden of proof on the privacy expecta-
tion issue, and that the case should be remanded to give the state an opportunity to offer such
evidence. Id. at 4132 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
19881
AMIucAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
reasonable expectation of privacy had been infringed?' ' ' 9 As Justice Brennan
sarcastically notes, the Court has not yet offered a clear definition of "inti-
mate activity," but surely an embrace between husband and wife within the
curtilage of their home qualifies. 230 Thus, if scientifically enhanced surveillance
is capable of observing such conduct (and of identifying it as such), this
should weigh heavily toward classifying the surveillance as a search, 23' even if
the surveillance equipment is generally available and is not particularly sophis-
ticated. 32
The aerial photographs in Dow were not capable or revealing "intimate"
activity or details .233 Presumably, the same is true of the naked-eye aerial sur-
veillance from a 1,000-foot altitude in Ciroolo. The surveillance in Riley is
much more likely to have provided the investigators with that capability. The
Riley plurality's refusal to consider this factor is unfortunate.
V. CONCLUSION
Since 1983, the Supreme Court has decided seven cases that focus on when
scientifically enhanced visual surveillance constitutes a "search" subject to
Fourth Amendment restrictions and standards. In addressing this issue, the
Court, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly, has considered three sep-
arate factors: the sophistication (or sense-enhancing capacity) of the surveil-
lance equipment; its availability to the general public; and the nature of the
information sought and revealed by the surveillance.
The Court's approach to technology per se is perfectly plausible. On one
hand, the more sophisticated the equipment, the more its use is likely to in-
trude. On the other hand, if the equipment is readily available to the general
public, it often may be unreasonable for a person to expect constitutional pro-
229. Id. at 4131 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ.). Justice Brennan
also demanded to know "[w]here in the Fourth Amendment or in our cases is there any warrant
for imposing a requirement that the activity observed must be 'intimate' in order to be protected
by the Constitution?" Id. Justice Brennan's indignation is a bit tardy: the Court had suggested
this as a relevant factor in Dow, Ciraolo and Dunn. See supra text accompanying notes 155-60
(discussing argument in Dow); supra text accompanying notes 112-13 (discussing majority position
in Ciraolo); supra note 53 (discussing four-part test enunciated in Dunn). Moreover, the Court
applied a very similar principle in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), when it held that
what a person says into a telephone in a public telephone booth is protected by the Fourth
Amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23 (discussing holding in Katz).
230. In Dow, the Court indicated that aerial photography capable of recognizing a class ring or
identifying a human face would "implicate serious privacy concerns." Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 n.5 (1985); see supra text accompanying note 160 (quoting Dow majori-
ty's argument).
231. It would be unwise to classify the surveillance as a search or not depending solely on what
the officers actually sought and observed, without considering the privacy implications of what
they might have seen.
232. Thus, use of a flashlight to peer through a substantially but imperfectly curtained room of
a street-level apartment would implicate serious privacy concerns, and should be considered a
search.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 155, 160 (quoting Dow majority's assessments of degree
of detail observed).
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tection from its use. The Brown and Dunn decisions involved the use of the
common flashlight, which must rank near the bottom in sophistication and at
the top of the list of general availability. Not surprisingly, the Court thus held
that the flashlight's use was not a search 2 4 (even though in Dunn the area
illuminated by the flashlight was a business location presumably protected by
the Fourth Amendment-a fact to which the Court gave less consideration
than it deserved). 2"1 The Knotts and Karo decisions focus on electronic track-
ing devices, equipment that is somewhat sophisticated and not generally availa-
ble. Knotts holds that use of this device to track public movements is not a
search, while Karo holds that using it to determine the contents of a private
location is. Each of these decisions is consistent with the "sophistication-avail-
ability" test for assessing the Fourth Amendment implications of visual sur-
veillance technology. Even the result reached in Ciraolo and Riley in which the
majority and plurality opinions ignored the technological aspects of naked-eye
aerial surveillance and held that such surveillance from publicly navigable air-
space is not a search, is consistent with this test.
Ironically, the Court's most explicit application of this test seems to make a
mockery of it. In Dow, the Court blandly insisted that use of a $22,000,
state-of-the-art aerial photography camera-a camera that dramatically en-
hanced what was visible to the naked eye-failed both prongs of its test. The
equipment was both too "generally available" and insufficiently sophisticated
for the surveillance to be considered a search.2 36 If Dow sets the standard for
Fourth Amendment assessment of visual surveillance technology in general, the
result could seriously threaten privacy.
It is clear, however, that the Court was well aware of this possibility. The
third factor in the Court's visual surveillance decisions-the nature of the in-
formation sought and obtained by the surveillance-may provide precisely the
limiting principle needed. Although in Ciraolo the Court concluded that the
aerial surveillance of a suburban back yard fenced to prevent ground- level
surveillance was not a search, the Court emphasized that the only significant
information the officers obtained by the surveillance was to confirm the pres-
ence of ten-foot tall marijuana plants growing in the yard. Similarly, although
Dow held that the state-of-the-art image magnification of private property
used in that case did not constitute a search, the Court emphasized that the
surveillance revealed only the shape and location of large industrial structures.
Each decision also calls attention to what kind of information the surveillance
did not reveal. In Ciraolo, the Court noted that the aerial surveillance did not
disclose "intimate associations, objects or activities.12 37 In Dow, the Court
emphasized that the surveillance revealed neither secret documents238 nor "inti-
234. See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text (discussing cases concerning artificial illumi-
nation).
235. See supra notes 54-69, 214-17 and accompanying text (discussing Dunn).
236. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text (discussing Dow).
237. See supra notes 112-204 and accompanying text (discussing Dunn and Dow).
238. See supra notes 160-208 and accompanying text (discussing aerial surveillance in Dow).
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mate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life.' "239
The emergence of this third factor introduces a new area of uncertainty into
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. At present few guidelines exist as to what
kind of information is protected from unauthorized technologically enhanced
visual surveillance, and what information is not. Thus, judges may be required
to rule on these situations with little to guide them but their personal instincts
about the information obtained in any given case.
Moreover, confusion is inevitable as to the comparative significance of the
three factors-sophistication (sense-enhancement) and availability of the equip-
ment, and informational privacy expectations-in any given case. What result
should obtain, for example, if police officers use binoculars to watch what a
person does in his or her home, if no comparable view is available to a na-
ked-eye observer from a "public thoroughfare" or an "open field"? For
Fourth Amendment purposes, are binoculars to be considered sufficiently "low
tech" to be classified with the flashlights used in Brown or Dunn, or suffi-
ciently "hi tech" to be classified with the electronic tracking device used in
Karo? The decisions to date provide no indication.
These potential difficulties and uncertainties could have been avoided if the
Court had held, in Riley, Ciraolo and Dow, that when an owner takes suffi-
cient measures to prevent ground-level visual surveillance of a location, any
technology that frustrates those measures is a search. Nevertheless, the Court
properly rejected this approach because it would have produced a fundamen-
tally absurd result. It would defy common sense to recognize a right to "pri-
vacy" in a ten-foot plant visible from 1,000 feet up, let alone in the shapes of
large industrial structures. Surveillance technology presents complex questions
of law, fact and values. The Court wisely avoided attempting to resolve them
with simplistic answers. No doubt there will be ample opportunities in the fu-
ture to address those questions more fully.
239. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1987) (quoting Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
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